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KING'S COLLEGE LECTURES ON COLONIAL PROBLEMS

KING'S COLLEGE LECTURES

ON

COLONIAL PROBLEMS

EDITED BY

F. J. C. HEARNSHAW, M.A., LL.D.

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KING'S COLLEGE

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PREFATORY NOTE

A LETTER

FROM THE

RIGHT HON. LEWIS HARCOURT, M.P.

HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

READ BEFORE THE DELIVERY OF THE FIRST OF THESE LECTURES, AND PUBLISHED HERE WITH HIS CONSENT

DEAR PROFESSOR BURROWS,

I HAVE to thank you for bringing to my notice the course of six Public Lectures on Colonial Problems which are to be given in May and June at King's College. I need hardly say how gratified I am to learn that University of London, King's College, has found it possible to make arrangements for the delivery of these lectures, and I must congratulate you on the extremely interesting programme which has been arranged.

I have noticed, with much pleasure, that two

of those who have served under me during my term of office have consented to render service to the University. Sir Charles Lucas's volumes on the history of the Colonies are recognised as standard works in the literature of the subject, and, from his long experience of the Colonial Office, there is no one better qualified to trace the influence on Empire of the progress of science. Sir Everard im Thurn can speak of native land and labour in the South Seas with an exceptional authority, as he has investigated the questions at first hand, and has brought to them knowledge of native customs and practices derived from experience in other parts of the British Empire. Professor Egerton is recognised as a leading authority on the early history of the self-governing Dominions, whose marvellous growth has brought to the front difficult and complicated questions of International Law which must in course of time be solved. I am glad to learn that these problems have now begun to occupy the attention of those who, like Dr. Lawrence, have made International Law their particular study. The British Empire is unique in the varied character of the forms of government

which exist within its bounds, and Sir John Cockburn, from his experience as an Australian Statesman in the days preceding federation, is abundantly qualified to deal with the problems presented by that most interesting development in government. The all-important and complicated question of the future relations between the various component parts of the Empire will, no doubt, be illuminated by Mr. Sidney Low in discussing the question of an Imperial Executive.

I presume that these lectures will appear in due course in some permanent form, and I earnestly trust that the interest shown by the public will be such as to repay University of London, King's College, for the action which it has taken in the matter.

Yours very truly,

L. HARCOURT.

DOWNING STREET,
10*th May* 1913.

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INTRODUCTION

THE lectures printed in the present volume were delivered at King's College during the summer term of the session 1912–13. During the preceding year, an address by Mr. Sidney Low before the British Academy had given rise to considerable discussion both in the Press and in academic circles as to the teaching of "imperial studies." Such a term was taken to include all that related to the history of the Empire, its laws and institutions, the languages and dialects spoken within its borders, its commerce and its economic resources. There seemed to be a general consensus of opinion that London should be the centre of such "imperial studies," and that the studies should be organised by a single authority.

The obvious body to undertake the work is the University of London. That University,

indeed, through one or other of its colleges, already provides many of the courses required for the realisation of the scheme, and what is mainly needed is extension and co-ordination. In the development of such a scheme of imperial studies, King's College will naturally take a prominent place. It lies in the Strand, in the centre of what may even now be called the Colonial Quarter of London, and exactly facing the plot of land on which, if Lord Grey's great plan is carried through, the chief buildings of the Dominions will be grouped. The precedent set by the delivery of these lectures is being followed up during the coming session, and Mr. Sidney Low has been appointed Lecturer in Imperial and Colonial History for the year. It is hoped that endowments will be forthcoming by which a permanent Professorship or Readership can be established in the subject, and associated with King's College.

The present volume bears on the face of it evidence that it is a collection of lectures. Each lecturer chose his own subject, and selected one on which he was peculiarly qualified to speak with authority. But it will be noticed that, though at first sight there appears to be a great diver-

sity of topics, there is this element of unity and completeness, that the lectures taken together present a typical and representative picture of the kind of problems, legal, social, constitutional, economic, historical, and administrative, that imperial statesmen are called upon to face to-day. They help to make clear that close connection between history and practical affairs on which such a pioneer as Professor Seeley was never tired of insisting. They show that it is by means of a careful and unprejudiced study of the past that the future can be faced with confidence.

RONALD M. BURROWS,
Principal.

F. J. C. HEARNSHAW,
Professor of History.

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
KING'S COLLEGE,
23*rd September* 1913.

I

THE COLONIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

I

THE COLONIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

BY REV. T. J. LAWRENCE, M.A., LL.D.

THE British Empire is unique in the history of the world. This has been said so often that it has become a commonplace. But there can be no doubt that the expression is literally true. I need not speak of the extent, population, power, or wealth of the world-wide realm to which we belong. These we hear of too much rather than too little. The constant boasts about them which come so trippingly from the tongues of one school of popular instructors tend to evoke pride and arrogance. There is such a thing as the intoxication of greatness, and history is strewn with the ruins it has caused. We, as an imperial people, need above all things the spirit of sobriety and the inspiration of duty. We are set to rule such enormous territories,

such vast populations, in order that we may rule them well. We have been given such a prominent position in the society of nations, in order that we may do great service for civilisation and humanity. And as soon as we begin to face in a serious spirit the tasks I have indicated, we see at once how great and complicated they are. The problems dealt with in this course of lectures are well fitted to occupy a large share of our energy and attention, yet they are but a few out of the many which confront us. Serious study of them is a necessary preliminary to right action with regard to them.

In dealing with the particular matter which has been committed to my care I cannot claim, as can so many of those who are to follow me, to have won the right to speak by success in administration or eminence in statesmanship. I am but a student and a teacher, an observer and recorder of other men's labours. But the descriptions and warnings of a watchman may sometimes be useful. I trust, therefore, that I may claim a hearing; though I have great need of your indulgence, since what I must endeavour to define — the position of the

Colonies in International Law—though in itself perfectly clear, is full of possibilities of difficulty, and even danger, in the future, and likely to impose a heavy tax on the wisdom and goodwill of both rulers and people.

There is no State on the face of the earth which can be described as "a body politic" more aptly than the British Empire. Though a person in International Society, though a unit in its dealings with other States, it is internally almost as complex as the human body, its parts are almost as numerous and as diverse, and the functions they perform almost as various. In Sir William Anson's great book, *The Law and Custom of the Constitution*, there is a chapter on "The Dominions and Dependencies of the Crown." This deals with—(*a*) The United Kingdom; (*b*) The Adjacent Islands, which term signifies the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, not all the geographical islands round our coasts, most of which, such as Skye, Arran, or the Isle of Wight, are in law parts of the United Kingdom; (*c*) The Colonies; (*d*) India; (*e*) Miscellaneous Possessions, in which are included Protectorates and Spheres of Influence. Here

there is indeed diversity. The mind ranges from Oriental Protectorates, like Sarawak with an hereditary Rajah making his own laws and appointing his own Civil Service, to India, under a Governor-General appointed by the Crown and a Secretary of State responsible to the House of Commons; from the Island of Ascension in the South Atlantic, governed like a man-of-war by the Admiralty, to the United Kingdom, not only governing itself through its Parliament and the Ministry dependent thereon, but also possessed of vast reserved powers which it might put in force at any time over any part of the Empire. But we must not linger over the spectacle of this extraordinary variety. We have to turn to the Colonies strictly so-called, and to their international position.

A colony has been defined by statute[1] as "any part of His Majesty's Dominions exclusive of the British Islands and of British India." This definition excludes Protectorates, seeing that technically they are not within the British Dominions, though other powers would undoubtedly hold Great Britain responsible for serious offences against their own

[1] 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, sec. 18.

subjects committed therein! But it includes a large number of possessions scattered over the surface of the globe, and placed under every variety of political rule from sheer absolutism to practically complete self-government. There are colonies with no legislature, colonies with a nominated legislature, colonies with a legislature partly nominated and partly elected, colonies with an elected legislative assembly and a nominated or partly nominated executive, and colonies under what is called responsible government. By this last phrase is meant that the heads of the great departments form, as in England, a Cabinet, whose maintenance in office is dependent on the continued support of a majority in a Legislative Chamber elected by the people of the colony. In such colonies self-government is almost complete. The Governor is appointed by the Crown, but he acts, like a Constitutional King, on the advice of his ministers. He can, however, refuse his assent to any measure passed by the local Parliament, or reserve it, which means that the Bill is hung up till the King, advised by his responsible ministers at home, either gives or refuses his assent to it. More-

over, it is a principle of our constitution that the Imperial Parliament can, if it pleases, legislate for any part of the King's Dominions—a power which, one need hardly say, is sparingly exercised, though it is very useful on certain exceptional occasions, as for instance when a group of colonies desire to combine permanently, and make for the future either a Federal Union or a Unitary State. The details of the new political arrangement are drawn up after consultation with the leading statesmen of the colonies concerned, approved by their local assemblies, or by a popular vote, or both, and finally embodied in an Imperial Statute. Thus it comes about that the Constitutions of the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Union of South Africa, are technically grants from the central authority of the Empire, conferring large privileges of self-government on the most important and advanced of its component parts. And since no powers over foreign affairs are given, no new international state is created, though for domestic purposes something little short of statehood is conferred. The Empire is still a unit as far as the rest of the world

is concerned, and when it takes part in the affairs of the family of nations, the voice that speaks on its behalf and binds it, is the voice of the King and Ministry of the United Kingdom. As Sir W. Anson well says "The Colonies, however complete may be their general measure of self-government, are a part of the British Empire, and are dependent upon it."[1] They are units, it is true, but, to use the fine phrase of the present Prime Minister, "units in a greater unity."[2]

This is how the matter looks when viewed from the standpoint of the constitutional lawyer. And if we turn from its domestic to its external aspect we shall find that the international jurist comes to exactly the same conclusion. As far as I am aware no continental publicist of repute has examined the question carefully. But in a recent English work of great and deserved authority I find more than one reference to it. In vol. i. sec. 65, of the second edition of Professor Oppenheim's *International Law*, published in 1912, the learned author

[1] *Law and Custom of the Constitution*, 3rd ed., vol. ii. p. 75.

[2] Opening Address of Mr. Asquith to the Imperial Conference of 1911.

says, "Colonial States have no international position whatever; they are, from the standpoint of the law of nations, nothing else than colonial portions of the mother-country, though they enjoy perfect self-government, and may therefore in a sense be called States. The deciding factor is that their Governor, who has a veto, is appointed by the mother-country, and that the Parliament of the mother-country could withdraw self-government from its Colonial States and legislate directly for them." He returns to the matter in sec. 85 when discussing international personality, and goes more thoroughly into it. The passage is so important that I feel bound to give it at length. "International Persons are, as a rule, single sovereign States. In such single States there is one central political authority as Government which represents the State, within its borders as well as without in the international intercourse with other International Persons. Such single States may be called *simple* International Persons. And a State remains a simple International Person, although it may grant so much external independence to outlying parts of its territory that these parts become in a sense

States themselves. Great Britain is a simple International Person, although the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, are now States of their own, because Great Britain is alone sovereign and represents exclusively the British Empire within the Family of Nations." To these weighty words I may perhaps add some of my own, written less than a year ago, as part of a lecture given to an audience, a large proportion of which consisted of foreign students. "For the purposes of the International Society the British Empire, and not the United Kingdom, still less England only, is the unit. If our Government makes a treaty, it applies to the whole Empire, unless there are in it express words limiting it to one portion only . . . Again, if we go to war all parts of the Empire are placed in a condition of hostility. The quarrel may be purely English, or purely Canadian, or purely Australian, but the enemy would be free to strike at any part of our world-wide dominions. We must pay the price of our greatness. Suppose the question at issue to be concerned, let us say, with Fisheries in the North Sea. Australia,

Canada, and South Africa might—I do not think they would—say to us, 'This matter is no concern of ours. We cannot help you.' But if they did, they could not claim to be neutral, and therefore free from attack by the enemy. And we may be sure that if an enemy saw a chance of invading their territory or injuring their commerce, he would take it. Indeed he would be foolish in the extreme if he did not. There is nothing in International Law to forbid him, and the blow might inflict great damage on us. The naval and military organisations maintained by our Colonies are part of the armed forces of the Crown and, whether or no they were placed under the orders of our Government in the event of war, they would be regarded as enemies by our enemy, and treated accordingly. The great self-governing Dominions cannot invoke the principle of limited liability. In war all parts of the Empire must sink or swim together."

For all practical purposes connected with these matters we may leave out of account the Crown Colonies, and concentrate our attention on those portions of the Empire we delight to call the Englands oversea. This is but another way

of saying that the rest of this afternoon's lecture is concerned only with Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Newfoundland, and especially with the three first, whose power, wealth, and population, make them in a very conspicuous degree co-partners with the mother-country in the burdens and privileges of Empire. Questions connected with the treaty-making power, and questions connected with war and neutrality, were sure to arise in the course of that progress from "colonialism" to "nationalism" which has been so marked a feature of the growth of our self-governing Dominions during the last forty years. I will try to deal with them in the light of the principles already laid down; and we will begin with the latter group, the questions connected with war and neutrality.

As far as I know, these first came into prominence in South Africa during the terrible time of stress and heart-searching that preceded the outbreak of the Boer War. On 28th August 1899, Mr. Schreiner, then Prime Minister of Cape Colony, said in the Cape House of Assembly, "If I am to see . . . that South Africa is to be the scene of war between

whites, that one race is to be set against another race in any part of Africa, I shall still say—and I say this to-day, not merely to this Colony, but to South Africa and the world—that I shall do my very best to maintain for this Colony the position of standing apart and aloof from the struggle, both with regard to its forces and with regard to its people." And a little further on in the speech occurred another passage to much the same effect. It ran, "If that unexpected and unhoped for event (War) is going to happen, it will become all of us to stand firmly together against that plague extending to our house. We shall endeavour then to do all in our power to preserve that peace which we have sought loyally and honestly to secure since the day when we put our hands to the plough of government of this country." It will be noticed that in neither of these passages does the word "neutrality" occur. But undoubtedly the first of the two sets forth, as something to be aimed at in the event of war, a condition of aloofness which is identical with one aspect of neutrality, though no mention is made of other aspects, such as the closing of frontiers against the troops of either side, or the refusal of supplies

of arms and ammunition to belligerent warships. Some years before I had the honour of teaching Mr. Schreiner International Law at Cambridge, and I think I can vouch that he knew too much about it to imagine that he was giving notice of an intention to make his Colony neutral when he said he would try to keep its forces and its people out of the struggle. But his technical knowledge was not widely diffused, and political feeling ran very high. Soon it was telegraphed all over the world that the Premier of Cape Colony meant to proclaim its neutrality in the event of hostilities. A few days after, on the 6th of September 1899, Mr. Schreiner disavowed emphatically any intention of the kind in an interview with the present Lord Milner, then Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner for South Africa, who reports what was said as follows :—"While he fully admitted that in case of war between Her Majesty's Government and any other State this Colony could not be neutral, yet he felt that in the interests of the Empire itself the two main objects that Colonial Ministers should in that case keep in view would be to prevent civil war breaking out in the Colony, and to guard against the dangers of a native

rising. Undoubtedly the forces of the Colony should be employed to protect the Colony, and he would regard any minister as most culpable who ran any risk of damage being done to the Colony either from the South African Republic or the Orange Free State. What he deprecated was the use of Colonial Forces against Republics outside the borders of the Colony. If they were so used he feared it might be impossible to restrain a rising on the other side, and there might be a conflict within the Colony itself." The incident was closed by a dispatch from Mr. Chamberlain to the High Commissioner, dated the 7th of October 1899. In it the Colonial Secretary expressed his pleasure at learning "that Mr. Schreiner has since explained that his words were not intended to bear the construction to which they were open," and added his approval of Sir A. Milner's view "that in case of war the Colonial Forces should, as far as possible, not be employed directly in offensive operations."[1]

The matter was soon forgotten amid the absorbing interest of the great drama which rapidly followed. But it cropped up again in

[1] Parliamentary Papers, *South Africa*, Jan. 1900, (Cd. 43).

1910, when an article in a Pretoria paper boldly advocated neutrality as the proper policy for the Union of South Africa when England was involved in war. A newspaper battle arose in consequence, and the political dovecotes were for a time a little fluttered. The most remarkable thing about the controversy was the attempt of the paper which started it to argue in favour of the legality of neutrality.[1] "It is wholly incorrect," it wrote, "to think that in case of England making war all self-governing British States are automatically involved. An express declaration or Act from the different Colonial Governments is essential before any neutrality can be broken." The exact opposite of these two propositions is correct. When the King, advised by his responsible ministers, goes to war, all his subjects and all his dominions are at war. It may very likely happen that actual military and naval operations never approach large parts of the Empire. But the whole body politic is nevertheless belligerent. Parts of it can no more remain neutral, than can parts of my body stay at home if I decide to go for a walk.

[1] The Pretoria *Volkstem* of 4th July 1910.

Can an instance be found in the whole course of our history of any Colony of the British Crown being regarded as neutral by friend or foe when the Empire was at war? Whatever its form of government, it followed the fortunes of the great body politic to which it belonged. The "express declaration" from Colonial Governments declared to be necessary before their non-existent neutrality can be broken is a myth. Nothing of the kind exists, and if it did, it would simply be waste-paper. The foreign policy of the Empire is controlled by the Home Government, whose advice the King is bound to follow, while those who form it remain his constitutional ministers. It may well be that some voice in the shaping of the advice to be tendered might with advantage be given to the great Dominions. But when it is tendered by the proper authorities and acted upon, it affects in matters of peace or war every part of the King's realm. The only way for any colony to obtain the right to determine these great questions for itself, is to secede from the Empire and set up a separate national existence of its own.

We must now turn our attention to Canada,

where, under the vigorous and capable guidance of Sir Wilfred Laurier, a school of political thought has arisen which insists very strongly on the complete autonomy of the self-governing Dominions, and regards each of them as a national entity distinct from, though in the closest connection with, the nation which inhabits these islands. The old colonial status does not satisfy the disciples of this school. They demand that the idea of partnership should be substituted for the idea of possession. The mother-country is to be looked upon as the head of a great co-operative realm, not as the owner of a number of territories beyond the seas. It is no part of my duty on this occasion to discuss these views. Personally, I have great sympathy with them. But it is necessary to point out that, when for the purposes of the internal organisation of the Empire something like a separate personality has been recognised as belonging to each of its five self-governing portions, it is difficult to exclude altogether the notion of separate personality from the domain of foreign affairs, hard though it may be to reconcile it, with the principle that the King's realm is a unit in its international aspect. Yet

we have seen that this principle is embodied in the law of nations, and cannot be infringed without splitting up the Empire into a number of new and independent States. I hope before I sit down to throw out for discussion a suggestion directed towards the reconciliation of these incompatibles. At present I have only to point out their existence, and to show how in actual fact they have already clashed. This brings me back to those questions of neutrality we were recently engaged in discussing.

At the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909, Sir Wilfred Laurier declined to give any undertaking on the part of the Government of the Canadian Dominion that in the event of war it would always place the vessels of the young Canadian navy at the disposal of the British Admiralty. He declared that his countrymen would take part in such a war only if they approved of it. Allowing for the great differences in external circumstances, this was akin to the declaration of Mr. Schreiner in 1899. In neither was the word "neutrality" used, but in both it was implied. Sir Wilfred Laurier proceeded to develop, as opportunity arose, his idea of a possible aloofness from imperial wars.

On 29th November 1910, he said in the House of Commons at Ottawa, "Under present circumstances it is not advisable for Canada to mix in the armaments of the Empire, but that we should stand on our own policy of being masters in our own house, of having a policy for our own purpose, and leaving to the Canadian Parliament, to the Canadian Government, and to the Canadian people to take part in these wars, in which to-day they have no voice, only if they think fit to do so. This is the policy we have presented."[1]

In 1911 Sir Wilfred attended the Imperial Conference in London, and in the discussions on foreign policy refused to associate himself completely with the request of the Premiers of the other self-governing Dominions, that they might be consulted beforehand on all matters of international negotiation that affected the Colonies they ruled. He desired for Canada full liberty to make her own commercial arrangements with foreign countries, but wished to leave all other matters to the British Government, reserving to Canada the right to decide for her-

[1] *Debates in the House of Commons, Dominion of Canada, Session of* 1910–11, vol. i. p. 455.

self whether she should take part in any war to which imperial negotiations might lead. For "If," said he, "you undertake to be consulted, and to lay down a wish that your advice should be pursued as to the manner in which the war is to be carried on, it implies of necessity that you should take part in that war."[1]

The matter cropped up again in the recent debates in the Canadian House of Commons on the naval proposals of Mr. Borden's administration. It is common knowledge that Sir Wilfred Laurier and his party strongly object to them. On the 7th of last month (April 1913), the veteran Canadian statesman made an impressive speech against them, mainly on the ground that they compromised Canadian nationality. Mr. Borden in the course of an equally impressive reply brought up the question of so-called neutrality in the following remarkable words :— "What is the attitude of the right honourable gentleman? Apparently he says now that we should not be represented on the Imperial Defence Committee, that we should not have any voice or part in the councils of the Empire —for what reason? In order that Canada may

[1] Quoted in the *Round Table* for August 1911, p. 405.

remain neutral in time of war. . . . He told us distinctly in 1910 that in certain wars, the character of which he described, Canada should stand neutral, and that her harbours and her courts should be neutral. It does not seem to me that it is possible for this country to remain a part of the British Empire upon these terms and yet to retain its self-respect. We must do either one thing or the other. If we are to remain part of this Empire, then we must take part in the defence of the Empire against all comers when any peril assails it. If we desire to be neutral in time of war, then it is not becoming to us to take advantage of the prestige and protection of the flag of the Empire in time of peace."

I strongly suspect that this controversy in Canada and elsewhere is largely due to the use of a technical term in a loose and non-technical way. In proportion as the sense of nationhood grows strong in a great self-governing Dominion, its rulers and people will desire that they should not be obliged to spend their blood and treasure in any wars which do not affect their vital interests, and which they may hold to be morally indefensible. Hence arises the disposition to

claim that their armed forces should be entirely under their own control, to be placed if they think fit at the disposal of the imperial authorities in the event of war, and if they do not think fit, to be kept at home, taking no part in the conflict. This view is by no means unreasonable. We must remember that any attempt on the part of the Home Government to use colonial forces in its wars as a matter of course is a veiled revival of the old claim to tax the Colonies without their consent—a matter which most of us have regarded as *res judicata*, since we read at school the history of the events which led to the foundation of the United States of America! Colonial troops and colonial warships would cost much more in the theatre of war than at home, and, on the assumption that they became active belligerents at the mere order of the Imperial Government, the people of their Colonies would in effect, though not in name, be taxed by the central authorities. Naturally the sturdy young nations beyond the seas do not contemplate anything of the kind with equanimity. Hence they sometimes talk about their determination to be neutral in purely British wars, if they deem them unwise and

unnecessary. In most cases all that is meant is that they would not give us the active assistance of their armed forces. Whether or no they should be legally obliged to do so, whether or no, if there be a legal obligation, it should be enforced, are matters for adjustment between Colonial and Imperial Governments. Other powers have no concern with them. They are not international in any sense of the word. But they are not questions of neutrality as it is known to and regulated by International Law.

Neutrality and belligerency are functions of sovereign States. They are predicated of international persons, not of parts of such persons. A power can no more be neutral in part and belligerent in part than a man can be married in part and single in part. Moreover, neutrality means much more than merely taking no active share in war. It has its obligations as well as its rights. A neutral must keep the land forces of the belligerents from crossing its frontiers, and permit no recruiting within its borders. It must prevent belligerent warships from taking in warlike stores in its ports and harbours, restrict their supplies of provisions and fuel, place a limit upon their stay, and greatly curb the

facilities afforded them for repairs, and even for obtaining information. Further, it must submit to the search and capture of its merchantmen by belligerent cruisers on the high seas. Any attempt on the part of one of the contending powers to protect them against seizure would involve the so-called neutral in hostilities with the other. How would Canada and Australia like to be deprived of the protection of the British navy in a war, or to be obliged to treat its fighting ships as strangers in their ports? Are they sure that their neutrality would be recognised by Great Britain's enemy? I am quite sure that it would not, if there were rich captures to be made at sea, or a fair chance of a successful attack on land. Again, what would be said abroad of the curious in and out arrangements involved in the so-called "neutrality"? Is it at all likely that foreign countries would recognise a state of affairs which would give to the self-governing Dominions all the prestige and security of the imperial connection in time of peace, and exempt them from all its disabilities in time of war? If ever the attempt is seriously made to create a curious race of international hermaphrodites which shall be British

at one moment and non-British at the next, parts of a vast whole when it is profitable to be great, and modest units when it is expedient to be small, we may be certain it will break down utterly.

But what cannot be done by a change of international status, or rather by an attempt to vary such status from time to time, may be accomplished, in so far as its objects are worthy, by a development of internal organisation. This sounds a cryptic saying, but it is perfectly plain when we come to deal with the matter historically. It involves a consideration of those questions connected with the treaty-making power which we postponed some time ago till we had dealt with the neutrality controversy.

As early as 1877, Lord Carnarvon, then Colonial Secretary, sent a circular dispatch to the principal colonial governments, with a view to meeting their objection to being bound by trading arrangements as to which they had not been consulted. He transmitted a copy of a draft article for insertion in future treaties of commerce, the purpose of which was to apply the treaty in question to the British Colonies, but with the understanding that no treaty with

a foreign power should include or extend to any British Colony which desired to be exempted from its operation.[1]

From the beginning of Canadian Confederation, the Government of the Dominion claimed to participate in the negotiations for commercial treaties which concerned it, and in 1871 Sir John A. Macdonald, then Premier, was appointed one of the plenipotentiaries to make arrangements with the United States in reference to trade and fisheries. This method was adopted on several other occasions; and they were but beginnings. The influence of Canada on commercial treaties which concern her continually grew, till now it is understood that she may negotiate them herself, subject of course to the approval of the Foreign Office, which technically makes the agreement on her behalf. It is no business of other powers whether the agent who deals with them comes from this or that part of the Empire. As long as he can pledge the faith of Great Britain to the instrument which embodies the results of his negotiations, it is enough. And with this end in

[1] Quick and Garran, *Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth*, p. 634.

view, in 1911 Sir Edward Gray agreed that he would endeavour to secure from foreign governments liberty for any of the Dominions to make its own commercial arrangements with foreign powers.

But the claim of the Dominions to negotiate commercial treaties for themselves was bound in the nature of things to grow into a more general claim to be consulted on all matters of foreign policy which affected their interests. Such a claim received an enormous impetus as soon as it was recognised, as it was in 1909, that there must be common arrangements for common defence. Accordingly we find that the Imperial Conference of 1911 passed, on the motion of Australia, a resolution to the effect that "The Dominions shall be afforded an opportunity of consultation when framing the instructions to be given to British delegates at future meetings of the Hague Conference; and that conventions affecting the Dominions provisionally assented to at that conference, shall be circulated among the Dominion Governments for their consideration before any such convention is signed. And that a similar procedure, when time and opportunity permit, shall as far as possible be

used when preparing instructions for the negotiation of other international agreements affecting the Dominions."[1]

To this same conference were submitted the Declaration of London and the last Treaty of Alliance with Japan. Both were approved, as also was the project, unhappily not yet realised, for a treaty of unrestricted arbitration with the United States. It is, however, interesting to note that in the limited Arbitral Convention negotiated in 1908, and now in force between ourselves and our American cousins, Great Britain reserves "the right, before concluding a special agreement in any matter affecting the interests of a self-governing Dominion of the British Empire, to obtain the concurrence therein of the government of that Dominion."

It is clear from this short record that the Imperial Conference, which is now to meet every four years, is rapidly becoming a most important organ of Imperial Government. But it does not solve the problem how to combine the self-governing nationhood of the Dominions with the unity of the Empire in the great sphere of external international affairs. I must

[1] Quoted in the *Round Table* for August 1911, p. 405.

not trench upon the province of the last lecturer in this course, and attempt to sketch out a plan for an imperial executive. But I may perhaps be allowed to say, that if some small central body could be created on which served among others the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary for the time being, along with a representative of the Ministry of the day in each of the great self-governing Dominions, it seems to me possible that the six great democracies concerned might be induced to place in its hands the momentous issues of war, peace, and neutrality. If this development of a new organ to perform these most important functions ever took place, every war would be an imperial war in reality as well as in name, and therefore no idea of an attempt to keep outside it would ever rise in any of the political entities whose representatives had agreed to make it. Doubtless, wars would be few—for, in the first place, it would be hard to induce a body representing such varied interests to risk them by engaging in hostilities, and, in the second, a conflict with the concentrated resources of the whole Empire would be so tremendous that few foreign powers would ever enter into it. But surely a reduction in

the number of wars, followed as it soon would be by a reduction of the enormous load of armaments which is to-day a menace to civilisation and a disgrace to humanity, would be in itself a boon of incalculable value. And it would not stand alone; for it would hasten the coming of that glorious time when the sword shall no longer be drawn among the nations, save to repel outrageous aggression or remedy intolerable wrong.

II

NATIVE LAND AND LABOUR IN THE SOUTH SEAS

II

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BY SIR EVERARD IM THURN, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.A. (OXFORD), HON. LL.D. (EDIN.).

HAVING been invited to contribute to this series of lectures on colonial subjects, I thought I could not do better than tell, as fully as time permits, the story of one case—fairly typical of many others—in which certain tropical land formerly exclusively occupied by natives (who may for the present purpose be sufficiently described, if not defined, as dark-skinned people of tropical origin) has now been invaded and more or less absorbed by white-skinned men originally of European race.

Now that most of the tropical regions of the world are more or less dominated by white men, it may be useful to study the way—often extraordinarily haphazard—in which this has come about; and we may consider the subject,

not merely as an interesting historical study, but also in order to ascertain how such tropical areas may be most effectively used, in the interest both of the white intruders and of the surviving dark-skinned natives.

The history of such a process of "western-isation," and the lessons which it should teach, are both still fairly obvious as regards certain of that great shoal of islands which, beginning at no great distance from the east coast of Australia, stretches eastward for some two-thirds of the way across the centre of the Pacific Ocean — which islands, all tropical, may conveniently be distinguished under their old name, as "the South Sea Islands," from the many other islands, all of more temperate climate, which lie round the edge of the Pacific, close to the American, Asiatic, and Australasian shore.

The whole history of the Pacific begins at a definite and comparatively recent time. Before the year 1513 (just 400 years ago), the very existence of this great sea, covering more than two-thirds of the surface of the globe, was rather assumed than known by men of our race. But one November day in the year just

named, Vasco Nunez de Balboa, having scrambled on foot across the isthmus of Panama, caught from "a peak in Darien" that first glimpse which ever a white man had of what we now know as the Pacific Ocean; and seven years later (in 1520) Magellan, having sailed round the southern end of America, entered and sailed across the "great South Sea," till he reached and passed out through the "Spice Islands" which barr the western exit from the Pacific into the Indian Ocean.

For two and a half centuries after Nunez thus saw, and Magellan thus sailed, across this sea, though a few ships from Europe were occasionally carried by winds and currents across the ocean, and though in Europe many strange tales were told of islands which they who thus passed in ships through these waters saw, yet never during that whole period was there such intercourse between these passing white sailors and the dark-skinned dwellers in the South Sea Islands as to produce much, if any, permanent effect on the thought and ways of the last named.

But, probably very long before that day when Nunez stood on the Peak in Darien,

there must have passed into the utter seclusion of that "closed lake" human beings who thereby separated themselves for a great period of time from the rest of the race. When and whence those folk entered we do not know; probably they entered more than once and from more than one direction. All that is certain is that this entry must have been before the human race as a whole had passed from the original egoistic to the later altruistic habit of thought, *i.e.* from the way of thought natural to so-called "savages" to that more advanced habit of thought which characterises the civilised man from the so-called "savage." Unless the tremendous difference in mental attitude between the primitive folk who thus first peopled the Pacific and those men of European stock who entered only comparatively recently is to some extent realised and constantly borne in mind, it is difficult, even impossible, fully to understand the causes of the actual relations between civilised men and "savages" when they first come face to face, as eventually they did in the South Sea Islands.

It must not, however, be supposed that even in the utter seclusion of the great South Sea

growth in social organisation ceased entirely among those ancestors of the present South Sea islanders who first buried themselves in those places. As in every other human society there must have been growth—and occasionally this growth in social organisation must even have been considerable—but it must have been the very different, and certainly slower, growth which is all that can take place when the habit of thought which gives rise to that growth is on egoistic rather than on altruistic bases. Doubtless the advance differed in degree in different parts of the South Sea, but the advance must always have been along a quite different line, and at a slower rate than occurred outside the Pacific, among civilised (altruistic) folk.

The islanders were hardly affected by any European influence till toward the end of the eighteenth century, when Captain Cook and his contemporaries, when examining the more prominent South Sea Islands, not only entered into more intimate relations with the natives, but also practically first discovered the eastern shore of the great island (or continent) which was then called New Holland but is now

called Australia, with the immediate result that on that eastern coast, at Botany Bay in 1788, a settlement of Europeans was founded—the first in those parts—and with the further result that from this settlement, which soon developed into what we now call New South Wales, European influence—of a sort—began to spread into such of the South Sea Islands as were most easily reached from the new settlement in Australia.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century a trade had begun from New South Wales to the islands (at first chiefly for sandalwood), and it was the wrecked and run-a-way sailors from the ships engaged in this and in the South Sea whaling trade, which began about the same time, and the convicts escaping from the penal settlement of Botany Bay who stole passages in these ships, who were the first white men to gain footing among the South Sea islanders. It was these outcasts from civilised society who—as though they had been thrown up on to the islands from the crests, or combs, of the inrolling waves—came afterward to be called by the convenient name of "beachcombers"; and it was these

beachcombers who were the first civilised thinkers to come into intimate contact with the fossil habit of thought then still retained by the descendants of those who, centuries before, had first passed into the South Seas and into its islands.

Time now compels me to restrict my subject almost exclusively to the story of westernisation in one particular group of these islands, *i.e.* to the Fiji Islands, which lie some 700 miles eastward from the point at which the first European settlement was established in Australia. These islands, lying as they do outside the tracks followed by the few who till then had—always in sailing ships—traversed the Pacific (though, as it has since appeared, the most important in that part of the Pacific), were almost entirely unknown before the beginning of the nineteenth century. Before that time Tasman (as early as 1643), Captain Cook, Captain Bligh (when turned out from *H.M.S. Bounty*), Captain Wilson of the missionary ship *Duff*, and—it has been said—a mysterious "Captain Barber of the *Snow Arthur*," had each sailed by and sighted one or more of the smaller islands of the Fiji group;

but—as far as is known—no white man before the coming of the beachcombers had ever effected a landing in Fiji, or entered into any sort of personal intercourse with the Fijians.

The Fijians at the time when they thus first came under some sort of European influence—at least those in parts of the islands readily accessible from the sea, for in the less accessible mountainous interior the conditions were different—were at a stage of social organisation somewhat different from that which prevailed in any of the other South Sea Islands. In the mountains of Fiji, as also in the islands to the westward, *e.g.* in the Solomon and New Hebridean Islands, the natives were—as to a great extent they still are—at a very primitive stage, split into a number of tiny independent groups, hardly more than families, each living almost entirely independent of the other. In the islands to the westward of the Fiji group, *i.e.* in what is now specially called Polynesia—as in New Zealand—the social organisation was further advanced, in that considerable districts, generally, whole islands, or even groups of islands, were under the sway of a sort of aristocracy of chiefs.

But in Fiji the conditions were not so uniform ; inland in the mountainous and less accessible districts the natives were still living in a number of very small independent groups, the members of each of which groups were practically equal in power ; but on the seacoasts and in the less isolated parts the people—chiefs and commoners—were united into comparatively large "kingdoms" ; and there was an almost perpetual state of war and rivalry between these tiny "kingdoms," each constantly striving to annex the other or the outlying members of the other.

It is important to note that the Fijians—again I say those in the more accessible parts—were, still are to a great extent, sharply divided into two classes, which are respectively spoken of as chiefs and commoners.

There can be little doubt that the commoners represent the earlier inhabitants of the islands, and that the chiefs entered the islands at a later time, overrunning and conquering the more accessible areas and enslaving the earlier inhabitants of the land. *Enslaving* is not too strong a word to use. For certainly, before European influence entered in and began to

upset the balance of power, the chiefs were absolute masters and owners of the commoners —bodies, souls (at least according to native ideas), and certainly of whatsoever, according to our ideas, would have been the property of the commoners; and to an extent perhaps unparalleled elsewhere, the commoners, strangely enough, acquiesced in this arrangement.

The relation of the Fijian commoner to the portion of land on which he—of course as a member of his own communal body—lived when white men first arrived in those parts has, I think, never been clearly understood.

In a lecture which has been too unguardedly quoted as the fundamental authority on Fijian "Land Tenure"—and has been printed in the *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*—the late Dr. Lorimer Fison, a diligent and careful student of anthropology, who lived for some years among the Fijians as a missionary, has shown fairly accurately the nature of the family system on which Fijian society was founded, and that each group (or family) was held to have the exclusive right of ranging over a certain portion of land; but he has tacked

on to this two assumptions which are, I believe, erroneous.

In the first place, he assumes that the boundaries of the family land were definite and unalterably fixed by tradition; whereas it seems certain that the family land was that area from which that particular family was able at that time to keep others out.

In the second place, Fison seems to assume much too definitely that this degree of right by might to occupy a certain definite area of family land was, when the always possible action of the chief, or chiefs, of that family was taken into consideration, something like ownership of landed property in our sense.

The real facts seem to be that the family group held the land only till turned out by some hostile neighbours—as part of the constant state of war between each family and its neighbours; and that the family always held its land subject to the will and power of its own chief or chiefs.

The power of the chief was extraordinarily absolute over the persons of the family. If he wanted the family land for some new purpose he might—if his relations with other chiefs

made him momentarily strong enough—take it, either removing the previous owners to some other land where they could be of more use to him, or, without adversely exciting public opinion, killing and eating the previous owners and thus effectively render the land vacant.

It may perhaps be urged in favour of Fison's and against my views on this point, that when, after the cession of the islands to England, inquiry was made into existing family holdings it usually seemed that within the memory of living native witnesses each family group, more or less, had held, or considered itself to have held, certain definite areas of land with certain definite boundaries. But in proportion as the process of westernisation proceeded the inter-family feuds ceased, and the power of the chiefs to dispose, in one autocratic way or another, of the family lands ceased; and whenever these ceased the rights of the family group which at that moment happened to be in possession of any definite area were, as it were, immutably fixed. It was as though with us a number of temporary lodgers were, by some cataclysm which destroyed their landlords, left in unquestioned possession of their holdings.

It is impossible to talk about Fijian native land holdings without bringing in the phrase "occupied and used"; and there is great danger that, for those unfamiliar with Fijian habits, the phrase may carry a wrong connotation. It must be explained that in Fiji occupation of land is not that which could fairly be called "occupation" elsewhere. The houses of the community, though often substantial, did not occupy much space. As to the cultivation of the community, the chief vegetable food stuffs were taro-roots (derived from several species of caladium) and yams (many of which were collected wild), also bread-fruit and coco-nuts. For the two first named each community almost annually cleared—at no great expenditure of labour—patches of planting land quite insignificantly small as compared with the size of the land which the community was supposed to occupy. Coco-nut and bread-fruit trees were rarely planted, except the few first introduced into a newly occupied district, but were allowed to propagate themselves and to grow practically untended until the fruiting stage was reached. Moreover, ownership of the trees by no means involved ownership of the soil in which these

grew; so that at a later date—and indeed down to the present day—there have been many very troublesome cases in which Fijians, having parted with their land, have long afterwards claimed in all good faith to have retained ownership in the fruit trees growing thereon.

Often at a good many widely scattered points in the land supposed to have been occupied by the community, and often at a considerable distance from the communal home, there grew some sort of natural produce which it was of importance to the community to collect from time to time—away in the forest a group of trees very suitable for making canoes, domestic utensils, or weapons of war, or, away in some distant swamp, there were reed-beds from which material for thatching their houses or making their innumerable mats had to be collected and brought home; and it was certainly convenient that they should have access to these more or less distant places without passing through land open to the other communities—more often than not hostile. For all these reasons a community pretended to "occupy and use" (really, to control) as large an area as that from which

its strength and its chief's favour enabled it to exclude others.

Nor in many cases was it the land only which the community pretended thus to control. The salt-water communities pretended similarly to control and exclusively to use the teri (or mangrove) swamps, which in many places occupy much space between high and mean water-mark, and even the water of the sea from the outer edge of the teri to where the outer edge of the encircling reef meets the deep sea. The community wanted exclusive access to all this in order, for their own use, to catch crabs in the swamp and fish within the reef, and, on and about the reef, to catch turtle for their lords and masters, the chiefs who claimed, and still pretend to claim, exclusive property in the turtles when caught.

Thus everything on land and for some distance out into the waters of the sea was, it was held, parcelled out between the various communities—though only for as long as by their own efforts, prestige, or the favour and assistance of their chiefs they could hold it. And yet by far the greater portion of all this was not occupied and used in any

real sense, at least as we should employ the phrase.

One quite natural—and fateful—consequence of the very scant use which the Fijians thus habitually made of the land in which they dwelt was that they never in any real sense acquired a habit of work. Getting, either from land or sea, as much as they needed for their actual support with very small effort, they never learned any better than, like a set of rather grown-up schoolboys, contentedly and joyously to devote the whole of the rest of their vital energies to the great game of war (it need hardly be said that it was really war on a very small scale, but conducted with infinite craft rather than temerity) which they almost constantly played with their neighbours.

The first white men to invade the islands were, as has been said, sailors who came in small craft, to pick up sandalwood and such other trifles as, unconsidered by the natives, were marketable outside the Pacific, and, at a slightly later date, "beachcombers" who, being cast ashore from these small craft, were—because, especially if they had guns and other European weapons, they were useful to native

chiefs in waging war on other natives—in a sense hospitably received and absorbed by the Fijians.

Certainly the entry among the natives of those first white-skinned visitors did not tend, by any force of example, to improve the moral character of the Fijian, but to some small extent it did increase his working capacity, though in no very desirable way; for the collection of cargo (sandalwood, *bêche-de-mer*, and so on) for the vessels which began more and more frequently to call at the islands imposed on the natives a small amount of desultory labour, which was done not *con amore* but as task-work for the chiefs, who needed the merchandise to give in exchange for the coveted weapons, cloth, and even empty and broken glass bottles so generously offered by the ships'-captains.

There are other points to be remembered in connection with the innate and not unnatural disinclination of the Fijian for work. It was by the action of white men that the Fijian was (of course only gradually) deprived of the once chief and most delightful occupation of his life —which was fighting (incidentally I may say that it has sometimes seemed to me that he has

been turned into the most law-abiding and least aggressive creature of my acquaintance); and he has never been able to see why he should use the superabundant leisure thus gained in working with the white man.

Again his disinclination to work has been steadily maintained by certain features of native custom (and I am afraid it is native custom which has been stereotyped by us—doubtless with the best intentions in the world). The Fijian lives under a so-called "communal system," in accordance with which he was hardly allowed to think, to work, and to earn personal reward for himself. He is bound by duly legalised "native regulation" to think at the bidding of his chief and for the supposed benefit of his community.

Even if, despite these restrictions, he happens to get hold of a small thing which he would like to keep, he is liable to be deprived of it at any moment by some other Fijian who demands it (*keri keris* it), and may not be refused without serious breach of "native custom."

Bearing in mind that the natives thus had no real hold on property of any kind, and that the power of the chiefs was almost infinite and

absolute, it is easy to understand that the chiefs were quite able—and were generally willing—to make over the very shadowy ownership of the land (except such small area as was necessary for their own support and that of their immediate followers) to any stranger, especially a stranger with the prestige afforded by a white skin, if only he seemed to be in a position to give, or even offer, in exchange for it something possibly trifling but momentarily more attractive to the native chiefly mind.

I must now rapidly sketch the events which happened in the Fiji Islands between the arrival there of the beachcombers (in quite the early years of the last century) and the cession of the islands—not to Great Britain, but to the great white chief, Queen Victoria (or so the natives say).

For some thirty years, or perhaps somewhat more, the beachcombers lived, no doubt with great satisfaction to themselves, among and upon the natives, generally attaching themselves to one or other of the more powerful chiefs, fighting the battles of their patrons, and in return receiving from these same patrons much native wealth and as many native "wives"

as they fancied. It is useless here to examine closely into such records as can still be gathered of the lives of these men. It must suffice to say that wherever their influence prevailed they brought about a state of things as to which Bishop Heber might have written more truly than he did of Ceylon, that "every prospect pleases, and only man is vile."

By the end of the period just mentioned a few more reputable Europeans had settled, as traders in a small way, at one or two places not far distant from the tiny little islet of Mbau, and more or less under the patronage of the then most powerful native chief of the group, who had adopted the islet as his stronghold.

And in 1837 some of that remarkably audacious band of missionaries who, from 1796 onward, were sent to the South Seas by the London Missionary Society first reached Fiji. These came with the avowed intention of converting the natives from their way of thought (the most prominent manifestation of which was cannibalism) to Christianity, and with the further purpose of introducing, if possible, some sort of order into the disorder created by the beachcombers.

More or less about the same time there arrived in those waters ships of war of at least three nationalities, from England, France, and the United States of America; and the purpose of these was to inquire into complaints by the white settlers (who were always becoming more numerous) against the native chiefs, and in some cases to make accurate surveys of the island waters.

About 1840 an elaborate survey of the Fiji group was made by the United States Exploring Expedition under Commander Wilkes; and shortly after—Wilkes having found that American ships, chiefly from Salem and other New England ports, were doing considerable business in Fiji, and that there were even a few American residents among the settlers—one of these residents, Williams by name, was appointed American consul. Again, shortly after, and probably as a result of this American appointment, a British consul (W. T. Pritchard) was also appointed. I am not aware that the French Government ever recognised a "consul" for their countrymen in Fiji, though French men-of-war captains (among others the famous Dumont d'Urville) certainly took active part

in the international game of "who can get the most influence" which went on in Fiji at this period. Nor—for fairly obvious reasons—did Germany recognise any representative of its own interests till a much later period.

I have never been able clearly to ascertain what was the exact status of these so-called "consuls" in Fiji at a time when there was absolutely no civilised form of government in those islands, and when not even had any one "savage" chief (or chiefs) obtained control over anything like the whole of the islands. But there is no doubt that, whatever the authority on which they acted, these "consuls" at an early date did exercise considerable influence in the game of landgrab which had then become fast and furious, and in which the settlers of various European nationalities all took part.

But though no one authority prevailed over the whole of the islands, nor even over any considerable part of the islands, there was in the chief, whose stronghold was in the little islet of Mbau, a man of great authority who, had he not been interfered with by the many different European influences which surged

around him, might have attained to supreme control over the islands.

Thakombau, who had in him such qualities as but for adverse circumstances might have made him one of the few great "savage" potentates of history, succeeded on the death of his father, Tanoa, as the "war-lord" of Mbau in 1852—though Thakombau had long before this date been the real leader of the Mbauans.

By the way, it seems to have been a French naval captain who began the practice of applying the European term "king" to the war-lord of Mbau; and this misleading practice prevailed till (in 1875) "Thakombau Rex"—*primus inter pares* of the then several other prominent chiefs of various parts of Fiji—resigned the control of the islands to Victoria Regina.

Thakombau, even before 1852, had perforce become much mixed up in land transactions. Almost constantly involved in small "wars" with his native neighbours, and in futile efforts to satisfy the specious claims which, in and out of season, the white settlers pressed upon him for compensation for injuries alleged to have been inflicted by natives, the distracted "king"

endeavoured to satisfy the whites by making over to them larger and larger areas of native land; and to free his native land for this purpose — whether it was really under the control of Mbau or not—he either transferred the previous occupants to some other place or —circumstances sometimes suggesting this as the more convenient course—killed and (in the days when he was still a cannibal, *i.e.* up to 1854) ate them.

One of many such transactions led—though only after long years and much trouble—to the final overthrow of native control in Fiji. It all came about in this way. Sometime in the forties, the American consul, Williams, who has already been mentioned, had acquired possession of the little island of Nukulau, which was situated at some distance from Mbau (as distance is reckoned in Fiji), but just within the area undoubtedly under the influence of Mbau. Once when the consul was celebrating the Day of American Independence, partly with a display of fireworks, his house caught fire and was burned down. Williams asserted that the fire had been purposely set by natives who, even if they had not been instigated by Thakombau,

were at least under that chief's control, and he demanded large compensation from the so-called "king." Thakombau denying all responsibility in the matter, Williams referred the dispute to his government. From time to time during a long series of years, American warships were occasionally sent to Fiji to inquire as to this alleged debt by Thakombau, and sometimes the captains reported in favour of Williams and sometimes against him. Meanwhile the alleged debt grew largely, partly by the accretion of interest, but more largely by the recurrence of other incidents in which—as in the case of the burning of Consul Williams' house — compensation was demanded from Thakombau for injuries supposed to have been inflicted on white settlers by natives alleged to have been more or less subject to Thakombau's control.

Oppressed by this load of doubtful debt, and more and more embarrassed by the incoming of more white settlers, most of whom demanded more native land, and by the intrigues of various native chiefs who had grown largely in power in various parts of the islands more or less distant from Mbau, Thakombau—though gener-

ally recognised by the absurdly inappropriate title of "King of Fiji"—had a really bad time. It was probably partly in order to avert this that he turned from cannibalism to Christianity.

In 1859 the English Consul, Pritchard, succeeded in getting not only Thakombau, but also the other more powerful chiefs, to sign a petition to the British Government to relieve them of the burden of governing Fiji. But the commission which was sent out to investigate the whole question reported—probably rightly under the circumstances of that time—that the cost of introducing order into the state of disorder which then prevailed in Fiji would be excessive; and the matter dropped for that time.

About ten years later, the demand for cheap English-grown cotton having become great, and it being found that this could be produced, as things then were, in Fiji, Australia and New Zealand poured men and capital into the Fijis; and a more or less powerful company was formed in Melbourne, which undertook to pay off Thakombau's old debt in return for further large concessions of land and privileges which

the soi-disant "King of Fiji" was supposed to give.

Between 1870 and 1875 the state of political affairs in Fiji was very curious. The planters, with others in their train, who had come to the islands in connection with the cotton boom, at once saw the necessity of establishing some sort of government on civilised lines. They were generally better educated and more practical men than the earlier white settlers; but they found it difficult to keep their feet in the wildly disordered conditions consequent on the conflicting interests of the earlier white settlers and "the confederations" which had been formed by the more powerful native chiefs. Moreover, the Fijians from the more inaccessible interior of the larger islands, many of whom had never been brought under the influence of the great chiefs of the seacoast and had certainly never been included in the "confederations" formed by the latter, now began to take every opportunity of slipping down from their mountain homes to lay waste with fire and club the homes of the white settlers, and occasionally to kill and eat those white men and the "salt-water" natives indiscriminately.

Renewed appeals from Fiji—in which native chiefs and white settlers now heartily joined—to be taken under British rule seemed for a time to meet with little response. The Government of the day at home was unwilling to take over a new Crown Colony—and one which, it was assumed, would not prove self-supporting. New South Wales, Victoria, and New Zealand—from one or other of which the planters and capital of Fiji had chiefly reached the islands—indeed often and strongly pressed the Home Government to undertake this white man's burden; but whenever it was hinted to them from home that this might happen if they, as the nearest and therefore the most interested colonies, would undertake to guarantee the cost, the question dropped for the time, and Fiji was allowed to stew yet a little longer in its own somewhat pungent juice.

Between 1870 and 1874 there were lively times in Fiji. Constitutions (modelled on that which had been devised in the Sandwich Islands, and had been transplanted to the Friendly Islands) were proclaimed, parliaments and elaborate executive governments were set up, and our old friend Thakombau Rex was on due

occasion trotted out; yet again and again the whole thing collapsed like a house of cards.

But the scandal had now become too great. Commander Goodenough (only a few months before he was killed by a poisoned arrow in the Solomon Islands) and Consul Layard were sent by the Home Government to arrange to accept from Thakombau Rex and the other great chiefs the cession of the islands. After these had done their work, Sir Hercules Robinson (afterwards Lord Rosmead) arrived from New South Wales, of which he was Governor; and, in 1875, Sir Arthur Gordon, afterwards Lord Stanmore, arrived to organise the distracted islands as a British Crown Colony.

Finally, I must tell something of the way in which the first Governor of the new British Crown Colony dealt with the state of almost hopeless confusion into which the affairs of old Fiji had fallen, and especially of the effect produced by his treatment of the native land and labour questions.

Sir Arthur Gordon—to call him by the name by which he will always be known in Fiji—started on his task of introducing order into this disorder with a very decided and commend-

able predilection for the preservation of the remnants of the original native system; and it may be admitted that the interests of the white colonists were to him only of secondary importance to those of the natives.

The Fijian social system, founded not on law but on custom, had already been purified of its very worst features (such as cannibalism and club law) by the influence of the missionaries and of the better among the other early white settlers. What seemed to Sir Arthur the more worthy part of what remained of Fijian custom —hitherto preserved solely by tradition—was written down in a series of so-called "native regulations," which were to be to the native, though thenceforward a British subject, as the ordinary law of the Colony were to the non-natives resident in Fiji.

I feel that the foregoing statement as to these native regulations is inadequate; but the subject is so complex that I cannot deal with it as a whole at the end of a lecture, and must confine myself to the effect on the subsequent conditions of native land and labour.

Among the retained parts of the Fijian system was the intense subordination or subservience

of the commoners towards their chiefs. It was intended that the Fijian communities should be, as before, ruled almost absolutely by their chiefs; and though the chiefs themselves were subject to the almost personal authority of the Governor, who as Turangi Levu, or "Great Chief," had responsibilities towards all Fijians more or less corresponding to those which, say, our old acquaintance Thakombau had, in pre-cession days, towards his people of Mbau. It was, of course, intended that the Governor, personally or through those whom he might depute, should check what may fairly be called the undue subservience and deference which, as has already been explained, had formerly enabled the chiefs to dispose of the lands without any restraint from the will of the people. As to the treatment of native land which followed the cession of the islands, vast quantities of this had been by that time assigned by the great native chiefs to aliens—possibly much more than actually existed within the limits of the islands; and certainly much of this land had been obtained and was held by white men on conditions which would not bear close scrutiny.

Sir Arthur Gordon's cure for this evil was

drastic and effective. He appointed a commission before which all claims by non-Fijians to land in the islands were to be submitted. Those claimants who could justify their claims were given what amounted to a crown grant, and all other claims were disallowed.

At the time of the cession (1875), by a special clause in the formal document which, being signed by Thakombau and the chiefs, effected this, it was provided that "the absolute proprietorship of all lands, not shown to be now alienated, so as to have become *bonâ fide* the property of Europeans or other foreigners, or not now in the actual occupation of some chief or tribe, or not actually required for the probable future support and maintenance of some chief or tribe, shall be and is hereby declared to be vested in Her said Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors." Notwithstanding this provision, and though it was presumably in return for the lands thus ceded that the heavy debts of Thakombau and the chief were paid, the land made vacant by the action of the Native Land Commission was allowed to pass back into the hands of the natives who were supposed formerly to have occupied it.

One effect of this, at first sight somewhat surprising generosity, was to leave hardly an acre of Crown land at the disposal of the Colony of Fiji; but it was held that the gift of the land to the Queen by the chiefs, at the time of the cession, was only a formal and ceremonial gift, such as *vaka Viti* (*i.e.* according to the custom of Fiji),—might at any time be made by an inferior to a superior, but subject to the understanding that the gift was to be immediately returned to the donor.

Another effect was that the greater part of the land which thus reverted to the natives became more than ever useless to anyone; for the natives had even then become too few to "occupy and use" anything like all of it, even in the old slack way. Incidentally, I may say that the decrease in native population had begun long before the date of cession, and shortly after that event was greatly accelerated by one of those strangely destructive epidemics—it was measles in this case—which work havoc among a native population not accustomed to the particular disease.

The Fijian who, as has been said, has never learned to work, sat down on the unused land—

to which, under the new native regulations and various native land ordinances, he had been given an infinitely more secure tenure than he had ever before enjoyed.

In these quite later days—now that the turn of events has enabled him to earn what are to him large sums of ready cash by the easy and desultory cultivation of bananas for the Australian and New Zealand markets on the "eyes" of his extensive land—the Fijian landowner is more than ever inclined to enjoy his *otium cum dignitate* (for which one can hardly blame him); and to let others—it does not matter to him whence these hail—do the hard work on such lands as the white planter can acquire.

I have left myself little time to speak as I should have liked to do of the native labour question in Fiji. Even before the time of cession, in the reign of "King Thakombau" in the early seventies, the planters who then flocked into the islands in connection with the cotton boom found that—Fijian labour being mostly unattainable in Fiji—coloured labour must be brought in from elsewhere. They therefore—as did the planters in tropical Australia—brought labourers in from the islands of other

groups (Gilbert, New Hebrides, and Solomon Islands); and, as has always been found elsewhere under similar circumstances, these natives worked better—indeed, very satisfactorily—away from their own homes and familiar surroundings.

It is only with considerable reluctance that I touch on this question of import of native labour, for it is in the true sense of the word a "horrid" question. I am, perhaps better than most men, aware that in the early days of so-called "blackbirding" in the Pacific many and even horrible outrages were, too often, committed in taking native labourers (so-called "Polynesians" or "kanakas") from the other islands to Fiji and to Queensland, and that even after Fiji became a British possession, and after strenuous efforts had been made by "Pacific Island Labour Ordinances" and otherwise, to regulate this traffic, grievous hardships were occasionally inflicted on the natives by certain ill-conditioned masters and men of the ships engaged in the work of recruiting. But I also know, and have assured myself, that a very large proportion of the natives transferred, even in those early days from their original

savage homes to new, and at least more civilised, places, settled down comfortably to themselves, and became excellent workers, and in their way, good citizens. The proportion of imported "Polynesians," at any rate in Fiji, who have benefited greatly—as they would themselves affirm—by their transfer had, during recent years, been greatly increasing.

"Polynesian immigrants," however—for reasons which it would take too long here to explain—are not suitable for all kinds of plantation labour. Therefore, immediately after the cession of Fiji, the Governor, while eager to improve the conditions under which "Polynesians" were brought in, arranged also for the introduction of a supply of East Indians into the islands. And these last-named coloured British subjects are now largely, one might almost say exclusively, used on the sugar plantations, whereas, till lately, "Polynesians" have been chiefly employed on the coco-nut plantations (in Fiji) and in the production of copra.

Lastly, if the development of Fiji as a British Colony is considered of importance to the Empire, both for its intrinsic value and as a

strategic centre and potential port, in what used to be the romantic South Seas—but, by the opening of the Panama Canal, is about to become one of the world's most important commercial centres—then the now largely unused native lands must be opened for use; and I for one certainly hope that this may be done with all due regard for the interests of the so-called "native owners." Moreover, either the Fijians themselves must in some way be persuaded to do a fair share of work, or more and more coloured labour must be brought in from outside. For it seems a quite certain fact that only a part of the manual labour necessary for the development of tropical possessions can be done by men born in temperate regions, and that less and less work can be done by each succeeding generation of families which have migrated to the hot regions of the world.

III

PROBLEMS OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION

III

PROBLEMS OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION

BY THE HON. SIR JOHN A. COCKBURN, K.C.M.G., M.D.

THE approach to federation in Australia was beset by many difficulties, and though the goal has been reached there are still some problems to be solved. The British race is characterised by its capacity of making a way or finding one through any obstacle; and often dangers which appear formidable in the distance dwindle to comparative insignificance as the line of march advances. The lion in the path, as the tariff problem was called by James Service, proved to be only a stage creature. Australia was not to be scared from the path of progress by the moth-eaten bogies of Free Trade or Protection. Sir Henry Parkes struck the true note when he claimed that the crimson thread of kinship was an all-powerful tie, and that "one people, one destiny" were the watch-words of victory. For fifty years Australian

federation had been a pet subject at the Colonial office. Here and there a British statesman had a dim vision of the imperial idea and the part that federation would play in its realisation; but often the motive for approval was mere convenience of administration, for evidently it would be easier to deal with Australian problems in bulk rather than parcelled out as they were into six several colonies with diverse and occasionally conflicting interests. It must also be confessed that there was in some minds in Downing Street a deliberate and steadily pursued intention to get rid of the Colonies altogether, and the maturing of federation seemed likely to hasten the time when, like ripe fruit, they would drop from the parent tree. It is well that the best laid schemes of men go oft awry. The very measures adopted to prepare the way for separation—such as granting autonomy, and leaving the Colonies to their own devices—far from alienating the offspring from the mother-country, provided the very atmosphere of freedom congenial to the growth of natural affection. Freed from tiresome leading strings, autonomous Australia became an intensely loyal Australia.

It was known to many at the time that federation as a means to separation had its advocates also in Australia. A quarter of a century ago, when it was widely thought that the ultimate destiny was separation, the Australian Natives' Association took up the question of federation as a preliminary to "cutting the painter" when the time came.

The problem of Separation was one of the three bomb-shells thrown by Sir George Dibbs into the Sydney Federal Convention in 1890, but that question never came within the region of practical politics, and very soon disappeared altogether. Nothing in the history of the Empire has been so marked as the rapid growth in recent years of loyalty to the monarch and the mother-land. Fifty years ago the spirit of republicanism was rife in the United Kingdom. Many of those past middle age will remember hearing in their youth the approaching twilight of English monarchy discussed by their seniors. All that has changed. No throne in the world's history has ever been so broad based on the peoples' will as that of King George v. Unlike the empires of antiquity, where the spirit of patriotism was strong at the

centre but languid at the extremities, it is at the outposts of the British Dominions that loyalty is at its zenith and the Crown is most revered as the symbol of Union and Empire. There were other elements which conspired to draw the Colonies more closely to the mother-country. A generation or so ago it was thought that civilisation had advanced to such a degree that the barbarous arbitrament of war had almost become an anachronism. This illusion did not last long. The campaign in South Africa dispelled what was left of it. The colonial contingents fighting shoulder to shoulder greatly promoted the feeling of solidarity. There is no cement so powerful as that of kindred blood poured out in common cause. The growth of world power in the Pacific awakened Australia to the fact that she no longer occupied a safe and secluded nook in the corner of the globe, but that she lay in the very theatre of the international conflicts of the future, and that outside the Empire there was no life for her.

The Fiscal question was the second bomb thrown into the Convention. Victoria, and most of the other Colonies, had definitely adopted the policy of Protection for their in-

dustries, while New South Wales still adhered to the dogma of Free Trade. As one of the objects of federation was the removal of Border Custom Houses, and the achievement of unhampered trade throughout the Island Continent, this problem appeared serious. No attempt was made to surmount so formidable an obstacle. The difficulty was not met by a frontal attack, but was evaded by a flank movement. The question of the tariff was by general consent left for the Federal authority, when constituted, to decide. Eventually the necessity of raising a certain amount of revenue determined the issue, and so the question of the tariff was settled in Australia—as it has been always and everywhere, and by all except England—by considerations of practical expediency and not of doctrine. A ring fence of Protection was placed round Australia, and the division fences of inter-colonial tariffs were removed. In its consummation, therefore, Federation may be claimed as a victory both for Free Trade and Protection. The policy adopted being Free Trade within and Protection from without. The extraordinary prosperity enjoyed by Sydney ever since the Common-

wealth was established, has amply justified the attitude of New South Wales in embracing federation; but the opinion whether that prosperity depends on intra-Australian Free Trade, or on outside Protection, depends on the colour of each individual's fiscal predilection.

The third bomb-shell was the site of the Federal capital. While the other difficulties existed chiefly in the imagination, and were never really encountered, this question bristled with awkward possibilities. Any of the capital cities would gladly have housed the Federal authority, but all were agreed that the political capital of Australia must be located in Federal territory, so that the Commonwealth should be master in its own house. The feeling was very strong in New South Wales that, as the mother Colony, she was entitled to have the Federal capital within her boundary; and after the failure at the first attempt to obtain the requisite majority in favour of the constitution it was stipulated, before the Act was submitted for the second time to the electors, that the capital should be in New South Wales, but not within one hundred miles of Sydney. Meantime the Federal Parliament was to meet in Melbourne.

After several sites had been discussed and rejected, that at Canberra was selected, and although many new names were suggested, none was considered to be of sufficient merit to supersede the native name, which was consequently retained. Elaborate plans, in conformity with the latest improvements in city planning, have been approved, and with much ceremony the foundation-stone of the Federal monument was recently laid. So that most difficult problem has been solved, although in all probability many years will elapse before the capital actually becomes the seat of government.

There were three successive Conventions occupied in giving shape to the Federal Constitution, and it is interesting to note the widening sanction under which they were summoned. The thirteen members of the first Convention, which met in Melbourne in 1890, were appointed by the respective governments. The delegates to the larger Convention, consisting of seven from each Australian Colony, and three from New Zealand, which met the following year in Sydney, were elected by the Parliaments. This Convention framed the Bill which formed the basis of all future constitution building, but it

did not arouse sufficient interest to induce the respective Parliaments to take effective action in adopting the measure. The third Convention, which met in 1897 in Adelaide and Sydney, and finished its labours in Melbourne in 1898, was appointed neither by the Crown, nor by Parliament, but was elected by the popular vote. Owing to this extended franchise its proceedings attracted sufficient attention to maintain the interest of the electors until the seal of public approval was placed upon the measure.

Some variations from the original Bill were introduced in 1898. The then United States example of electing the Senate or Second Chamber by the State legislatures was followed in 1891; but in 1898 it was decided that the members of the Senate should, like those of the House of Representatives, be elected by the popular vote. The last Convention abolished plural voting, and introduced the Referendum, both for ratifying the Constitution at the start and for amending it afterwards. The greatest danger which threatened the Convention lay in the difficulty of reconciling the views of the large and small States as to the representative power

to which each was entitled in the Federal Parliament. It was agreed on all sides that the number of representatives of each State in the Lower House should be in proportion to the population of the State, and, in order to safeguard the smaller States, it was also generally conceded that in the Senate each State should have the same number of representatives. The hot dispute was as to the powers in regard to money bills, which were to be granted to the Senate, whose intended function was to guard the rights of the several States. More than once this contention threatened to break up the Convention. A compromise was inevitable if anything was to be achieved, but some members had misgivings as to the reception of any concession by the people of their colony. Towards the close of one session, in 1890, Mr. Macrossan, a delegate from Queensland, called attention to the fact that a similar danger had confronted the Convention which framed the United States Constitution at Philadelphia, and cited the noble words used by George Washington at that crisis: "If to please the people we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we after-

wards defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair, the event is in the hands of God." Mr. Macrossan appealed to the members of the Convention to emulate the spirit of the father of his country, and to do what they thought to be right in scorn of consequence. He spoke under deep emotion; tears were in his eyes, and, when he concluded, the whole assembly sat silent for some time, spell-bound by his earnest appeal. The Convention then adjourned, and the members when they met next morning addressed themselves in a more amenable spirit to the great work in hand. Thus the spirit of the mighty dead came down to us through the century and assisted us in our deliberations.

The Constitution of the Senate is still a matter of discussion in Australia. Many advanced Liberals at the time of framing the Constitution were chary of granting the Second Chamber ample powers, for fear that it might have a strongly Conservative bias, and would prove an impediment to Liberal legislation. The reverse of this is, however, the case. The Senate is the more

democratic House of the two, and has a much larger majority of labour members than the House of Representatives. It is singular that while the United States has recently altered its Constitution by providing for the election of the Senate direct by the people, many in Australia are now regretting that the Convention of 1898 did not follow the Bill of 1891, in providing for the indirect election of the Senate by the State Parliaments, as was at that time the method in the United States.

Federation is in the air, and Australia in adopting that form of government has but pioneered in a path which is destined to become an imperial highway; for it is only on Federal lines that the further consolidation of the Empire can be accomplished. A few remarks, therefore, on the general characteristics of a federation may not be out of place. Federation occupies a position midway between separation and complete union. It affords greater safety from aggression than isolation, and greater efficiency than a mere alliance, but it lacks the unity of purpose of a complete amalgamation. This midway plane may be reached either by descending from unification, as in the case of

Canada, where Ontario and Quebec, previously united under one Parliament, were by the Dominion Act separated into provinces; or by ascending from practically complete separation, as in the case of the Australian Colonies. Both in Canada and Australia, the pre-existing legislatures retained all powers not enumerated in the Act, while only specified powers were entrusted to the new formations. This explains the fact that in Canada the Dominion Parliament holds all the unenumerated powers, while the Commonwealth Parliament possesses only those powers made over to it by the States under the Federal Constitution. In a federation no government is in all cases supreme. Each moves within its own lines, and when acting within the limit of the powers granted to it cannot be interfered with. The State Governments are not subordinate to the Commonwealth Government, but are co-ordinate with it. People who have lived under a Sovereign Parliament seem to find great difficulty in understanding the working of the Federal system. Federation is probably in no case a final form of government; it is a transitional stage between separation and complete union. To take an illustra-

tion from biology, a federation may be likened to the Crustacean in the animal kingdom, in which the blending of the original segmentation of the various parts of the anatomical structure is much less perfect than in the vertebrates, although, even in man, this segmentation can still be distinctly seen in the vertebræ, and as was discerned by Goethe, in the skull. So long as the watchword of mankind is Liberty, a federation presents the only practical form of government in which the widely scattered and highly diversified Dominions of the British Empire can be brought into organic union. In a federation is to be found the reconciliation of the apparently contradictory terms of empire and freedom. It combines flexibility with firmness, and although it lacks the vigour and unity of purpose of a completely unified government, it gives greater scope to that genius for local autonomy and that inborn capacity for managing their own affairs which characterise the British race.

There are not wanting those who maintain that it would have been wiser for the Australian Conventions to have drawn up a scheme of unification, but that was practically impossible.

The Colonies would, at that time, make no greater surrender of their powers than federation implied; some of us, indeed, would have preferred to continue the looser form of confederation under the Federal council which was then in existence, and to cede powers to that body as public opinion ripened towards closer union. Failing that, we did all in our power in the Convention to buttress what are known as State rights against Federal encroachment.

Since that time, the feeling in favour of unification has, as might have been expected, become much stronger. The federation being now in the flesh, and having justified its existence, it is but natural that many who demurred from transferring their allegiance from the known to the unknown, should now be willing to entrust the Commonwealth Government with more extensive powers. A petition a mile long in favour of unification was some time ago presented to Parliament. How far this feeling has grown will shortly be seen by the results of the Referendum, which will be taken on Saturday.[1]

[1] The questions referred were negatived at the Polls. The general election resulted in a majority of one for the opposition

It should be noted that the Labour Government now in power do not advocate general unification. The Referendum, broadly speaking, is on the question of whether there is to be a unification of industrial legislation throughout Australia, or whether such measures are to remain, as at present, chiefly in the hands of the State Parliaments. The Labour Party claim that the questions referred should be decided in the affirmative, in order that industrial legislation may be placed on the same footing in Australia as it is in Canada, where it is in the domain of the Dominion Parliament. To this it is retorted that the parallel does not hold, for in Canada there is a Conservative Second Chamber, which can be relied upon to revise labour and industrial legislation, whereas in Australia the democratic Senate would be likely to pass any measure supported by the Labour Party with a celerity resembling that with which in former days Bills favouring vested interests were passed by Upper Chambers, composed chiefly of members of the privileged classes.

in the House of Representatives, and consequently the Fisher Government resigned.

At the Referendum, which coincides with the general election, the consent of the electors will be invited to six laws amending the Constitution which were passed by the Commonwealth Parliament in 1912, relating to—(1) Trade and commerce; (2) Corporations; (3) Industrial matters; (4) Railway disputes; (5) Trusts; (6) Nationalisation of monopolies. If these Referenda are carried, some novel legislation will be brought into force. The selling of imported goods below the fair price of production will be prohibited, and so what is known as dumping will be checked. Under what is known as the New Protection, it is proposed to levy an Excise tariff on all manufactures, but the duty will be remitted if the manufacture is carried on under prescribed conditions as to the health and rate of wage of employees. In this way any doubt as to Protection being in favour of the workman will be effectually removed. Should ever the new Protection be proposed in this country, the attitude of Trades Unionists in maintaining the principle of unrestricted trade would probably require to undergo revision. In Australia, it is quite usual, as in the case of the tariff, to em-

ploy taxation as a means of social amelioration.

Some of the alterations of the Constitution now proposed were, in 1911, submitted by the present Government to the electors, but the Referendum was defeated. Many in this country, unacquainted with the nature of a Referendum, expressed the opinion that consequent on the defeat of their measures the Government ought to have resigned. Had they done so, they would have frustrated the main object for which the Referendum was instituted. When measures are, as in a general election, complicated by personal predilection for candidates and by side issues, it is impossible to get a clear verdict from the country. The Referendum is embedded in the Federal Constitution as a necessity for obtaining an impartial verdict on the important question of its amendment. It is also frequently employed by the State Parliaments to obtain a decision on any vexed question into which Party feeling or prejudice has been imported. No special legislation has been found necessary to establish a Referendum in these cases. A clause is merely added at the end of an Act to the effect

that the Act shall not come into force until it has been approved by the electors.

Although the alterations proposed by the Referendum are being brought forward by the Labour Government now in power, several of them have been at various times advocated by members of the Opposition. Indeed, many of the measures which form planks in the Labour platform were originally proposed by those who were in no way associated with the Labour Party. Thus it was a lawyer who first proposed industrial conciliation, a physician who introduced progressive taxation, and a capitalist who championed Commonwealth Old Age Pensions. Much of the policy of the Labour Government consists of measures which are supported, and many of them originally brought forward, by Mr. Deakin and his followers. Indeed, the position of Mr. Deakin, in spite of his magnificent qualities, has been, for the time being, made impossible by those who espouse his measures, but decline to follow his lead.

Young nations, like young individuals, are too much enthralled with the zest of living to find time to cultivate the grace of gratitude for past services. The organic demands of growth

are too imperious to permit of retrospect. All is in the future. To have done is to hang like rusty mail in monumental mockery. Although since 1910 the Labour Party have had a clear majority in Parliament, independent of alliances, up to that date the House was divided into three parties: Conservative, Liberal, and Labour. Mr. Deakin likened the position to trying to play cricket with three elevens. An attempt was made to combine Liberals and Conservatives in opposition to Labour under the title of the Fusionists, nicknamed by their opponents as Confusionists. The combination proved to contain incompatible elements, and resulted in the return of Mr. Fisher to power with a working labour majority.

The Labour Party in Australia differs from that in some other countries, in the fact that it is composed chiefly of men moderate in council and level-headed in action, whose leaders have undergone a rigorous and continual process of individual selection, and, although it may seem strange to say so, are usually men with a Conservative tendency. They are essentially patriotic, and in their devotion to law and order are the antithesis of the usual type of

continental Socialists. They are practical men of affairs, with a contempt for all "isms." Having emancipated themselves from the blighting influence of *laissez-faire*, they are not likely again to fall into bondage to a phrase. If they may correctly be described as State Socialists, it is not because of any rigid attachment to a theory, but simply because in certain directions they found that to place an activity under State control gave better results than under private enterprise. For this reason they support State education, State railways, State bank, State mining batteries, State grading of produce, free distribution of forest and fruit trees, State touring bureaus, State hostelries, and in some cases State brickworks and State coal mines, as well as State interference with trade in the shape of Protection, not to mention Old Age Pensions, Wages Boards, Maternity Endowment, and such measures as tend towards the improvement of social conditions. For though eminently practical, the Australian workman is something of an idealist, like the Scotsman, who will bargain with you in the shop over a pound of butter and then take you into his parlour and discuss metaphysics with the

ingenium perfervidum Scotorum. The Australian workman lives in an atmosphere of faith and hope, and looks for the auspices of a better age.

But legislation nowadays in every country has a socialistic flavour. Ever since the time when war was taken out of private hands, and made an exclusively governmental monopoly, the tendency has been to extend indefinitely the sphere of State activity. For it must be admitted that we live in an age of co-operation, whether the tendency is extolled as fellowship, or denounced as Socialism.

Australia has but played the part of the pioneer in this as in other directions of legislative activity, witness the Ballot, the Real Property Act, Progressive Taxation, Payment of Members, Woman's Franchise, Land Taxation, Minimum Wage, Marriage with Deceased Wife's Sister, Local Option, Children's Courts, Industrial Arbitration, and many other reforms. The whole world is also marching in these directions. So that Australians are in the position of those who in reading a novel have glanced at the last page of the volume. From their own experience they already know what the *dénouement* will be although they still

watch with interest the steps leading to the foregone conclusion.

But let it not be thought that the predilection of the Australian for paternal or, as some have termed it, grandmotherly legislation, has in any way weakened his fibre as a scion of the British race. The institution of a system of universal military service and the sacrifice made towards the establishment of a naval squadron amply refute any such suggestion. Considerable surprise has been expressed by the Labour Party and even by some Liberals in this country that Australia, admittedly the most democratic country in the world, should have adopted such measures. But this involves no paradox or contradiction. It is because every man and every woman has a voice in the affairs of the country that they think their interests are worth defending. The people are the State and national defence is self-defence. Under the Cadet system every youth in the Commonwealth is trained to bear arms if need be in the defence of his country, and on reaching manhood he passes into the Militia. There is nothing, however, of Militarism in the community. The best way to avoid the danger of being placed under

Martial Law is to be strong in defence. Apart from the insurance against war risks, afforded by preparation, the discipline to which the cadets are subject has in itself excellent results on the individual. This may be gathered from a quotation from the regulations. "The constant duty of a cadet is to respect the uniform he wears by becoming conduct on all occasions, strict silence in the ranks, and implicit obedience to orders. Those best fitted ultimately to command are those who have shown they can obey." Already the Australian youth has under this régime improved in behaviour and appearance. He holds himself better, looks smarter, and loafing is said to have disappeared. Australian workmen are determined to do all in their power to safeguard the precious jewel of imperial liberty. Who shall say but that their enthusiam may some day penetrate the stopped-up ears of the Labour Party elsewhere.

In naval defence Federated Australia has achieved wonders, the squadron is already attaining quite a respectable strength. His Majesty's Australian battleship, *Australia*, carries eight 12 in. guns, and is of 25-knot speed, and 44,000 h.p. There are three second-class cruisers,

named *Sydney*, *Melbourne*, and *Brisbane*, and six destroyers and submarines. Some of these are being built in Sydney. During the next three years there will be added one battleship, three destroyers, two submarines, and a supply ship. It is difficult to understand the opposition that until lately has been manifested by almost everyone in this country to the creation of an Australian navy. The three recognised modes by which the Colonies can contribute to imperial naval defence are, by a pecuniary subsidy, by the gift of battleships, or by building and maintaining a naval squadron of their own. Australia has in turn adopted all these three methods, but there can be little doubt that her example in finally deciding in favour of a local fleet will eventually be followed by the other Dominions. In the case of a subsidy the money is paid over, and there the matter ends; in the case of the gift of a Dreadnought, after the ceremony of handing it over to the imperial authorities, the vessel is lost to view. But in the case of a national navy, the people have constantly before their eyes an object lesson both educational and inspiring, they feel a pride in providing a nucleus of imperial

energy growing in strength with the State. Before many years are passed, the bulk of the white population of the Empire will be inhabitants of the Dominions beyond the sea. If there were only one organic centre of naval activity, how are the junior imperial partners to learn the hereditary art of ruling the waves? As one of the manifold arguments against an Australian navy, it was said that sufficient recruits to man the vessels would never be obtained. This illusion has been completely dispelled; in eighteen months, 1800 recruits have been enrolled, and the supply exceeds the demand. The cost of the squadron has not been paid out of loan money, as was originally intended, but out of revenue; and, in spite of the comparatively large expenditure, no grumbling against the vote is heard. The opinion of Admiral Henderson, who lately reported on the naval defences of Australia, may here be quoted. "A time has arrived when it will be recognised that Australia has done, and is doing, not only far more than others towards strengthening the sea power of the Empire, but what is right, natural, and proper towards the defence of her own territory."

It is usual to cite Australia as the one example of a federation accomplished and maintained without the stimulus of an external danger. The correctness of this view is now open to question. The rapidly increasing armaments of other nations in the neighbourhood of Australia, together with the withdrawal of British battleships from Eastern waters, has proved the necessity of a united front if Australia is to preserve herself as an integral part of the Empire. If federation had not been adopted when it was, at leisure, it would now in the light of recent events have to be undertaken in haste.

The formerly six-pointed star in the Australian flag has now seven rays, representing the six states with the addition of the territories, under the control of the Commonwealth. The most important of these latter are Papua or New Guinea, and the Northern Territory, which has been made over, under certain conditions as to railway construction, by South Australia.

Ninety-five per cent. of the people of Australia are of British descent, and they are steadfast in their resolve to preserve the Continent as a stronghold of the British race in the Southern seas. In the face of vehement opposition they

have adhered to their determination not to permit the introduction of a racial problem into a land fortunately free from such a complication. Northern Australia lies within a few days' sail of teeming millions of coloured races who, unchecked, would soon overrun the Continent, and would imperil the continuance of its free and democratic institutions. In the eyes of right thinking and unprejudiced people, Australia needs no apology for declining to be inoculated with a trouble which has elsewhere been found to be incurable. The policy of a white Australia is not as it is sometimes represented to be, merely a plank in the platform of the Labour Party, it is the definite and unalterable determination of the Australian people as a whole. The feeling is instinctive, and is not dictated by motives of material advantage; on the contrary, the incursion of a large coloured population would by the exploitation of their labour furnish the white man with the means of getting more rapidly rich.

It is strange that so many in the mother country should feel it incumbent upon them to be at pains to prove that their fellow-countrymen in Australia are incapable of tasks which

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experience has shown can be successfully undertaken by white men. At one time it was said that Europeans could not perform manual labour in the Northern Territory. When, in face of the continued good health of miners and others, this position had to be abandoned, a final stand was made on the statement that anyhow the white man could not work in the sugar brakes. But whereas, ten years ago, the sugar production by Europeans was less than one-third of the total, it has, as the result of a bonus, risen to thirteen times the quantity produced by coloured labour; while the death-rate of the Kanakas greatly exceeds that of white people. Whether in the mines, the stokehold, or the tropics, it has been proved in practice that the white man's powers of endurance under arduous conditions exceed those of any coloured race. This is what might theoretically have been expected; for the same capacity for variation which evolved the white man from the coloured myriads of the human race brought with it unrivalled powers of adaptation as a concomitant of that supreme act of differentiation.

Although the greater portion of the Northern Territory lies within the tropics, there is a

marked absence of the usual tropical diseases. The climate is healthy, and successive generations of Europeans show no sign of deterioration. Hitherto the inaccessibility of the Northern Territory has been a bar to its successful settlement. It abounds in high-grade mineral deposits and, especially in the vicinity of its numerous rivers, the soil is adapted for every variety of tropical production; but in the absence of adequate railway facilities the expense of supplies and of carriage of products to the seaboard verges on prohibition.

The providing of an adequate population for so vast a space is one of the problems that face the Federal Government. They are, however, awakening to the obligation in this respect which devolves upon those who hold unoccupied territory. Nature abhors a vacuum, and covetous eyes are, in these colonising days, cast in the vacant spaces of Australia.

Inducements to attract a suitable population, including leases largely rent free and monetary advances, are now being offered on a generous scale. These are meeting with a ready response. For the first instalment of twenty-six farms on the Daly River, there were 339 applicants. When

complete railway communication from north to south is provided, the Northern Territory will become one of the most valuable assets of the Empire. Similar considerations as to the necessity of more densely peopling the whole Continent are animating the State Governments. A vigorous immigration policy is being prosecuted.

In spite of distance, Australia is becoming a favourite field for emigrants. The exodus of able-bodied men from some of the agricultural counties, coinciding with a general decline of cultivation, in England has caused a marked scarcity of labour. Influential journals that were wont to chide Australia for lack of energy in encouraging immigration seem now disposed to cavil at the result of the vigorous measures lately adopted to attract population.

The best way to make a forest of oaks is by planting acorns, and the best addition to a population is an increased birth-rate. Fill your cradles was Mr. Roosevelt's advice. The Federal Government by its maternity bonus is setting the fashion.

Those who have watched the proceedings of the Dominions Royal Commission in Australia will have noted the enthusiasm with which its

members speak of the resources and future of that favoured land. It is a land richly endowed with all the ingredients of national wealth. Blest by a heavenly climate, the earth yields her increase with a profusion and magnificence which appear phenomenal even to the dwellers in the garden islands of the United Kingdom. In place of the rigours of winter there are two springs in each year. The seasons are, of course, in the southern hemisphere reversed. Yuletide is in Australian midsummer, yet, in spite of the heat, the festival abates nothing of the traditional roast beef and plum pudding of Old England. The Australian people are alert, as befits those steeped from their birth in sunshine. Possessing under the Commonwealth and State Constitutions the utmost freedom, they are characterised by a strong attachment to law and order. The many reforms in which they have led the way have been brought about by a studied observance of constitutional methods. It is safe to assert that in dealing with the problems that still lie ahead, loyalty to the Crown and Constitution, devotion to British tradition, and love to the mother country will continue to be the dominant notes.

IV

THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE ON EMPIRE

IV

THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE ON EMPIRE

BY SIR C. P. LUCAS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

THE problem of Empire is, in plain English, how to hold together lands and peoples which are distant or diverse or both. Distance implies diversity, for distance produces different types of the same race. This has been the problem of all Empires, ancient and modern alike. Ancient and modern Empires differ in many respects. For my present purpose I take two points of difference only, and the first is—Size.

The greatest of all ancient Empires was the Roman Empire. The Empire of Alexander the Great was ephemeral. His wonderful life only lasted for thirty-three years; for only thirteen of these years he was on the throne, and, when he died, the Empire which he had created broke up. The Roman Empire stands out as

incomparably the greatest Empire of ancient times; and, in my opinion, though I have been criticised for saying so, of all Empires, ancient or modern, it is the most fruitful for comparison and contrast with our own. I am glad to read that a chair has been established in Manchester University for the study of Imperial Rome. Now, Gibbon tells us that in the time of the Antonines, when the Roman Empire was at its zenith, it was "supposed to contain above sixteen hundred thousand square miles." The estimated area of Canada is nearly three and three-quarter million square miles. Canada, therefore, is twice the size of the whole Roman Empire.

The second point of difference between ancient and modern Empires which I wish to emphasise is—that Democracy has entered into the sphere of later Empires as it never entered into the Empires of old times. We all know the Greek saying, that a democracy cannot govern an Empire. It never did, it always failed. The Greeks kept their democracy, but never achieved Empire. Carthage was not a democracy, but an oligarchy like Venice in the Middle Ages, and, whether democracy or

oligarchy, Carthage failed in the work of Empire. The Romans alone made and kept an Empire, and they substituted for democracy a military despotism. Whether the reason was that the ancients had no system of political representation, or whatever was the cause, the fact remains that in ancient times and afterwards down to a comparatively late epoch, Empire implied despotism.

Now bearing in mind my definition of the Problem of Empire, that it is the question how to hold together distant or diverse peoples, and bearing in mind the difference between ancient and modern Empires, first in respect of size, and secondly in the fact that Democracy is present in modern Empires, whereas it was absent in ancient, I ask you to consider with me for a few minutes the influence of science on Empire.

I take first the influence of science upon politics and political life. Much no doubt has been written on scientific invention, but our modern histories are given us in watertight compartments. For instance, scientific invention is finely dealt with in a chapter in Lecky's *History of the Eighteenth Century.* Mr.

Herbert Paul in his *History of Modern England* writes: "The permanent effect of the iron horse upon the comfort and habits of society has been far greater than any legislation. Combined with the electric telegraph, a later, but not a much later, discovery, it called a new world into existence, or, at any rate, revolutionised the old. Watt and Wheatstone annihilated distance and almost destroyed time." Many passages might be quoted showing that modern historians are fully alive to the forces of science; but the influence of science on politics has not been adequately dealt with as a whole, and I submit that a book is wanted on this one subject of science as the author and parent of political change: I hope some member of the present audience will write it. For democracy is the direct product of scientific invention—real, not claptrap democracy; I mean, the growth of the many, the equalising of human beings, the strength of the people. Our chairman is descended from the great statesman who carried the first Reform Bill, but in his presence I venture to say that the effect of Laws and Reform Bills upon political progress has been infinitesimal compared with that of scientific in-

vention. The inventor and the engineer go in front: the statesman follows after: politicians gather up the fruits of science and unconsciously claim them as their own. Let us take some illustrations of what science has done.

The most obvious illustration is *Printing*. The art of printing was discovered, it may be noted, in the same century in which Columbus discovered America, and it may be noted, too, that Columbus presumably would not have discovered America, unless somebody had discovered the mariner's compass. What was the art of printing? It was the art of giving knowledge to the many instead of the few; it was the machinery of national and international education. Dr. Johnson tells us that "knowledge is more than equivalent to force." Popular knowledge, the result of printing, is equivalent to democracy, which is the force or strength of the people.

Take the case of *Steam*. Green, in the *Short History of the English People*, writes that the steam-engine was transformed by Watt's discovery (in or about the year 1769) "from a mere toy into the most wonderful instrument which human industry has ever had at its

command." Great inventors are the men who strike the point at which a dream becomes a reality, at which the toy becomes the weapon of human life. Take one form of steam—*Railways.* Mr. Humphry Ward, in *The Reign of Queen Victoria*, writes that prior to railways, "since the close of the Middle Ages inconvenience and expense had made travelling the privilege of a class." With the advent of railways, travelling ceased to be the privilege of a class, it became the perquisite of a nation. Men ran to and fro, and knowledge was increased; populations were transferred; great centres were created; the face of the land, the thought and life of the people, were changed; the pace of life was quickened for good or ill. In an age of steam democracy became inevitable; large cities became inevitable; the peasantry could no more be *ascripti glebæ*: constant movement of body means constant movement of intellect and radical change of system.

Take a very homely illustration—*Bicycles.* The invention of bicycles has made poor men into carriage folk. The bicycle takes a man from town to country, from indoor to outdoor life. Through the bicycle he sees life, he is

taught to observe, he meets other and different citizens from those among whom he lives. This one invention has altered the whole outlook of the poor classes of the community.

Take *motor traffic*, and only one species of motor traffic, private motor cars. In the book of the prophet Nahum it is written, "The chariots shall rage in the streets, they shall jostle one against another in the broad ways, they shall seem like torches, they shall run like the lightnings." I put it to you that private motor cars are an irritant to democracy; they arouse the democratic instinct because every one has to get out of somebody else's way; they may and probably do excite class feeling, but they quicken the sense of rights and wrongs, and so are a stimulus to democracy. A man who is in constant danger of being run over becomes keenly conscious of his own rights and other people's responsibilities, and that has something to do with modern democracy.

Science then has made democracy inevitable. Modern Empires must be or become Empires under democratic conditions. Russia must infallibly become more and more democratic. Either democracy will govern an

Empire, or nothing will. Further, by making democracy inevitable, science has made labour, for the time being at any rate, a distinct and marked class force in politics. On this point I have a word to say later on.

Now turn for a moment to the size of Empires. It is obvious that the difficulty of holding together distant and diverse peoples is increased in proportion to the size of the whole, and the one countervailer of size and of distance is science. The Romans were the most successful Empire builders of old times for two reasons. The first reason I have given you. It was because they discarded democracy. The second reason was, that they called science into play more than did other ancient peoples. Gibbon writes of the Roman roads, "If we carefully trace the distance from the Wall of Antoninus to Rome and from thence to Jerusalem, it will be found that the great chain of communication from the north-west to the south-east point of the Empire was drawn out to the length of 4080 Roman (3740 English) miles." For purposes of comparison it may be noted that the Canadian Pacific railway from Montreal to Vancouver covers

2900 miles. Gibbon continues, "Mountains were perforated and bold arches thrown over the broadest and most rapid streams"; and of the Roman posts he writes, "By the help of these relays it was easy to travel an hundred miles in a day along the Roman roads." It is a puzzle to me why the Romans went so far in the application of science and did not go farther. I had long contentedly accepted the fact that they did not know this and did not know that, but then I began to ask myself why did they not know it? The question probably appears a silly one and would be silly if Rome had not in some directions, in roads, bridges, and buildings, achieved results which can hardly be bettered at the present day. The Romans were a people of great intellectual force. Like the English, they applied their strong intellects to practical purposes, to concrete work. They were steadily growing and developing for generations, and the history of scientific progress has shown that one step leads on to another. Why then did the Romans stop short? A Roman must have seen the water rising and falling in his bath, but locks on canals were apparently not in-

vented till the Middle Ages. A Roman must have seen his kettle boiling and the lid being raised in the process, why was there no application of the power of steam? What was the reason why this able people, who held and moulded practically the whole world, whose peculiar genius was in the direction of what was practical and useful, that is to say of applied science, came to a certain point and never went beyond. It is a question which I cannot answer and to which so far I have received no satisfying answer.

About the beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria the forces of science were coming into full play. It is to me very remarkable that they were not more appreciated by British writers and thinkers on imperial questions. Lord Durham indeed saw what was coming, for in 1838, when he wrote his report, he looked to a time when "the passage from Ireland to Quebec would be a matter of ten or twelve days." But take Sir George Cornewall Lewis, statesman and political thinker. He published the *Government of Dependencies* in 1841, fully two years after Lord Durham's report was published. In that admirable book there is a chapter on *Reasons for*

governing a territory as a dependency. The reason is in effect distance, and the writer argues that distance may be countervailed by two principal agencies among others. The first is *A skilful arrangement of the executive machinery of the Government and particularly of the organisation of its naval and military forces.* The second is *The goodness of the roads and bridges and an advanced state of the art of navigation affording the means of rapid locomotion both by land and sea.* He might have been a Roman, writing of the Roman Empire. He writes of dependencies not colonies, of roads, bridges, art of navigation. He speaks in this chapter in general terms of modern inventions for accelerating transport, but he makes no specific reference to steam; and I have only noticed one reference to railways in the whole book, that is in a note which mentions "the invention of steam railways." Yet he published his book in 1841, and the line from Stockton to Darlington was opened in 1825.

One great English writer was eloquent on the forces of science. That was Thomas Carlyle. In *Signs of the Times*, written in

1829, he says "It is the age of machinery, in every outward and inward sense of that word, the age which, with its whole undivided might, teaches and practises the great art of adapting means to ends. Nothing is now done directly, or by hand, all is by rule and calculated contrivance. . . . We remove mountains and make seas our smooth highway; nothing can resist us."

I defined the Problem of Empire as how to hold together lands and peoples which are distant or diverse or both. What is the modern British problem? It is how to hold together under democratic conditions lands of great size and widely scattered, with very diverse peoples, which are at a great distance from each other. What has science to say to this problem? Science bids us think in centuries. It bids us take our courage in both hands and argue from the past to an evolution slow perhaps, if counted in months and years, but very fast and increasingly fast, if counted in generations. Science answers, In no long time there will be no distant lands and no distant peoples. Adam Smith and others argued for representation of the old North

American Colonies in the British Parliament. The great Edmund Burke ridiculed the suggestion. In *Observations on a Late State of the Nation*, published in 1769, the date, be it noted, of James Watt's patent, Burke wrote of the man who favoured colonial representation in England, "It costs him nothing to fight with Nature and to conquer the order of Providence." We have fought with Nature, and it was not the order of Providence. Burke went on to give six weeks at lowest for the passage from America to England. Now, after less than a century and a half, we give less than six days. Put us on another century and a half, argue from the past, remember that progress is at constantly accelerated speed, there can be but one conclusion—There will be no distant lands and peoples, the problems will be problems not of distance but of neighbourhood.

So far we have been running on the earth or crossing the sea, but what of the air? Carlyle, in 1827, quoted the German Richter as saying "Providence has given to the French the Empire of the land: to the English that of the sea: to the Germans that of the air."

Richter was laughing at the German thinker of his day as being up in the clouds. But less than a century later the words have a wholly new meaning. The Germans to-day would, it is true, not be likely to concede to other nations lordship of land or sea, but lordship of the air bids fair to be most important of the three. All points to annihilation of distance, and Science answers the question how to hold together distant lands and peoples by saying, The question shall cease to exist. But on the one hand distance has already done its work in creating diversity even in the same race, and on the other hand the growing diminution of distance is creating new problems. What has Science to say in either case?

Distance in democratic days, which democratic days were the result of discovery and invention, made the grant of colonial self-government a necessity. Self-government was granted because one set of Englishmen cannot adequately govern another set of Englishmen living at a distance. "But," said Science, "though I cannot undo the results of distance, achieved before you called in my full forces, I will find salvation for the British Empire by

creating the many scattered British possessions into a few small units, which, from their strength and their own cohesion, will more readily cohere in a larger whole."

I now ask you for a few minutes to consider Science as a creator of large units in the Empire.

The reasons why we lost the United States of America have been the subject of many writings. I should give two main reasons myself—first, the absence of steam and telegraphy; secondly, the fact that before the war of American Independence England was dealing with thirteen comparatively small units and not with one large one. Suppose the thirteen Colonies had been consolidated into one dominion before the years when the friction came, probably the friction would not have come; the nearer approach there is to equality between parties, the more prospect there is of harmony. It is the relation between large and small, strong and weak or apparently weak, superior and subordinate, which creates friction, as witness the case of Great Britain and Ireland.

The Dominion of Canada, as it stands today, is a creation of railways. The 145th section of the British North America Act runs,

"Inasmuch as the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have joined in a declaration that the construction of the intercolonial railway is essential to the consolidation of the Union of British North America and to the assent thereto of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick . . ." Here is a declaration that the condition or one of the main conditions on which certain communities agree to federate is that a railway shall be made. In the case of British Columbia it was the one condition which outweighed all others. The railway engineer made Canada a dominion from sea to sea: science created this large unit.

Turn to Australia. So far as Australia is not wholly one, it is due to absence of railway communication. Hence the great importance of the line from Western to South Australia, which all friends of Australia are so glad to see is being taken in hand.

Turn to South Africa. In an address on *Geography and Statecraft*, which has just been reprinted, Lord Milner said, "And then came the railway, by far the most potent of modern inventions in transforming the life of mankind, potent and revolutionising everywhere, but

most of all in thinly peopled and newly settled countries, and, among these, of incomparable potency in South Africa, owing to the vast distances which separate the chief centres of European settlement, and to its almost total lack of navigable waterways." The Union of South Africa would have been impossible without the railway.

Look away from South Africa to Africa as a whole. Would it not be true to say, that in the last half century Africa has for the first time set up as a continent?

In the past, the north of Africa was the south of the Mediterranean basin: the west of Africa was the east shore of the Atlantic lake across which black labour was ferried to the New World: the east of Africa was the west shore of the Indian Sea, and a place like Zanzibar was really an Eastern dependency; the Cape of Good Hope was an isolated outpost in the Southern seas. All this is changed: the Nigeria railway, the Uganda railway, the Cape to Cairo railway, all the various lines are linking up the sides to the centre. Africa through discovery and through science has become a continent.

We devote our attention, I think, rather too exclusively to the great self-governing dominions, but this process of the creation of large units is going on apace in the tropical dependencies. Professor Seely has warned us not to think or speak of India as one, but railways and telegraphy are bringing at any rate a nearer approach to unity in the great peninsula. Bombay, for instance, has become a port and distributing centre, not for a Presidency only but for the whole of India. Nigeria illustrates the unifying process. A very short time back there were in this part of West Africa three dependencies—the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos, Southern Nigeria, once the Oil Rivers Protectorate, and Northern Nigeria. They have now been or are being combined under one government, and the pioneer governor of Northern Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard, has appropriately been called back to take charge of the great unit. This is the result of the railway, of improved communication. The effect of improved communication may be seen again in the Far East. Singapore was one and not the earliest nor at first the greatest of three Straits Settlements, it is now

the centrepoint of a great British dependency, including the Malay Peninsula linked by a north and south railway, British Borneo, and one or two outlying islands. Under our eyes, as the result of steam and telegraphy, what is little short of a Far Eastern Empire is coming into being. In the West Indies again there is more and more tendency to and talk of federation into a larger whole, as witness Mr. Murray's recent book on *A United West Indies.* The making of larger units in the British Empire, the bringing of those larger units closer together, is the work of scientific invention, of steam and telegraphy.

But steam and telegraphy do more. I recall Carlyle's words, "All is by rule and calculated contrivance." Steamers give not only quicker but more assured communication. Certainty is substituted for uncertainty; there are now no long intervals of doubt or inaction; there is no necessity for fits and starts. Science has given us continuity. Democracy, which was the fruit of science, gave birth to the mischievous party system, the worst enemy of Empire because most inimical to continuity. But science in turn has provided the remedy

by making continuity almost inevitable, with the happy results which have been evident in the latter day conduct of foreign and imperial matters. Telegraphy again gives us to-day to-day's events all the world over. Wolfe won his victory on the 13th of September 1759, the news reached London on the 17th of October. Had the battle of Quebec been fought to-day, you would be reading the details in the evening newspaper side by side with the news of the Derby. Science, in short, has provided that, if we lose our Empire, it shall not be for want of knowing what is happening elsewhere at the moment, and it shall not be for want of continuity.

Science and religion, two forces often coupled and often contrasted, have been and are, I should say, two of the strongest and two of the most underrated forces in our Empire. It is idle to minimise the effect of religion. Take religion out of English history and but a skeleton of history would be left. Where would have been our Central African Empire if David Livingstone had not lived? I submit that a book is wanted setting forth the potency of religion in the making and keeping of

Empire, setting religion in its right place as a great imperial force. But here I couple science and religion in order to compare their effects upon the migration of human beings. Both the one and the other have been repellent forces. As we all know, the Pilgrim fathers went to New England to worship God in their own way; and the Huguenots, driven out of France by religious persecution, enriched England, British possessions beyond the seas, the Netherlands, the Cape, and so forth. Similarly, in the early years of the nineteenth century, scientific invention caused a great displacement of population. The introduction of the spinning-jenny, the substitution of machinery for handlooms among the weavers of the north of England and the south of Scotland, gave rise to much unemployment and consequent distress, with the result that there was a wave of emigration from the British Isles to British North America. Both religion and science again have been attractive forces. As religion in past times attracted men and women to lands where they could live their lives as they wished, as missionaries are attracted to fields where there is a harvest to be gathered, such as China at

the present day, so science has gathered human beings to mines, only made fruitful through the work of scientific men. Take the case of the Rand in South Africa. Suppose the fact of the gold had been fully known, suppose the railways had been in existence, but eliminate the mining engineer and the modern machinery for extracting gold from far down in the earth, then the later political history of South Africa would never have been dominated to the extent to which it was dominated by the goldfields of the Transvaal and the population which those goldfields attracted.

I have referred to the tropical dependencies of Great Britain. Lord Milner and others have laid stress on the dual nature of the British Empire. It consists of dominions and dependencies, of white men's lands and coloured men's lands. Is this distinction always going to be maintained? What is the answer which Science gives? I note three points. In the first place, the coloured men—in most cases—will not only survive but multiply, owing to modern sanitary and medical science and to modern engineering, as illustrated in the great irrigation works of India or in the Assouan

dam. Lord Cromer tells us that the modern imperialist "will not accept the decrees of Nature." He will not, he fights Nature in her destructive moods. He not only prevents famine and disease, but he makes lands bear human beings which never bore them before. This was brought home to me when I visited the Kalgoorlie Goldfields in Western Australia. Here was an arid desert converted into a dwelling-place for thousands of human beings by water brought for a distance of 350 miles, a triumph of engineering enterprise.

Note, in the second place, the result of this. I quote Lord Cromer again. He says in *Modern Egypt*, "Modern medicine and surgery are essentially European sciences," and again, the British engineer "justified Western methods to Eastern minds." In other words, science is lending out the white man's intellectual capital to the coloured man, and thereby producing equality between white and coloured. And here I propound another question which I am not prepared to answer. Does this process end with putting white men's machinery into coloured men's hands and teaching them to use it; or, is it trans-

forming the coloured men, except for their colour, into white men? My third point is the question, Will these tropical lands in days to come be homes for coloured men only? Will there always be a difference between healthy and unhealthy lands for the white men? Science answers, There will always be hot and cold climates, but not only will there be no distant lands, there will be no unhealthy lands. A recent Blue Book on the vital statistics of British West Africa shows that the death-rate among white officials was, in 1903, 20.6 per 1000; in 1912, 12.4: that the average length of service was, in 1903, 1 year 9 months; in 1912, 6 years 3 months; and that the number pensioned on account of ill-health in the later year was little more than half the number pensioned in the earlier. Sir Ronald Ross has written of West Africa, "A great country hitherto paralysed by malaria." It is no longer paralysed by malaria, largely in consequence of Sir Ronald Ross's own great work; and I am glad to be here this afternoon if only to bear witness once again to the wonderful work done by medical science and research for the British Empire and the world—not least along the

great ship canals which are the product of engineering science, and which are changing the world, at Ismailia, for instance, or in the Panama Canal zone. Look on a century. Where will be the unhealthy places of the world, or the places for coloured men only? Medical men must now be placed high in the list of empire builders, and their work is breaking down the division between white men's lands and coloured men's lands.

I have spoken of science as a remover of distance, a creator of large units, and as making all lands healthy. But the problem of Empire is how to hold together diverse as well as distant peoples, and we have noted that science in removing distance has created new problems.

Does science tell us how to hold together diverse peoples? No. Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or can science do it for him? No. On the contrary, by annihilating distance science very greatly emphasises and therefore increases diversity of races, and it does so, moreover, by creating democracy. Here I come to the colour problem, to my mind the most difficult and the most dangerous of all

the problems of the British Empire. It is true that the difficulty is not wholly a colour difficulty. Suppose all races were of the same colour, there would still be race prejudices and antipathies, as objection is felt from time to time in North America to certain classes of white immigrants from the south and east of Europe. But in the main colour constitutes the line of diversity, and though colour feeling appears to be of modern origin, no confidence can be felt that it will disappear.

What then have we to set on the other side? In the first place, the rise of coloured nations, notably of the great nation of Japan, due to the work of science, all makes for greater respect and therefore greater harmony. A similar result follows, in the second place, from wider knowledge and therefore greater discrimination between the various coloured races. Such discrimination must tend to blur the somewhat insolent main line of difference between white and coloured. In the third place, where, as in Europe, peoples are closely packed, lines tend to be marked out making for lasting peace more than is the case in emptier and more fluid regions. The west of

Europe is at present more stable than the fluid east of Europe. To my mind increase of population, coloured and white alike, will be not a greater danger but an additional safeguard. Lastly, science, like religion, takes no count of colour or race. The more science leads and fashions thought, the less will colour present itself as a prejudice, and the more will the preservation of a line of distinction between widely different races be regarded, not as a matter of superiority and inferiority, but as a natural distinction which all parties think well to maintain.

From the point of view of these last words, I ask you to consider for one moment a forecast of the future of our Empire. To do so, look back first to Lord Durham and the beginning of colonial self-government. It would be roughly true to say that self-government has been regarded in the British Empire as a kind of general panacea, and Lord Durham has most rightly been held in honour as its parent and author. But people are apt to forget that self-government has been carried to lengths which Lord Durham never contemplated, and that he held fusion of races to be

a necessary preliminary to self-government. Now self-government in its more democratic phase has not been accompanied by fusion of races. A phrase—a somewhat claptrap phrase—which used to be much in vogue, is "force is no remedy." There are times and circumstances when force is a remedy. There was far more fusion of races under Roman despotism than under British democracy, and small exaggerated nationalities are the spoiled children of modern democracy. Self-government has distinctly not fused races, but what it has done is to enable different races, while remaining different, to live in friendly co-operation side by side. French and English in Canada are hardly, if at all, more fused than when Lord Durham went out to Canada, but Canada is none the less a strong, undivided dominion, and in the Dominion Parliament the two races are represented side by side, and political parties are not wholly on race lines. Now argue from the Dominion of Canada to the whole British Empire. Bear in mind the effect of democracy; bear in mind the colour problem; think in terms of long years to come and of large units. I look to a future of the

Empire in which there will be different groups of races, forming in the main large units, all on an equal level, not aiming at fusion but agreeing to differ, and yet none the less common citizens under one sovereign, sitting side by side in an Empire Parliament, as French and English in Canada, Dutch and English in South Africa, and, most notable analogy of all, Maories and English in New Zealand. Colour is a bar to fusion, but it is also a bar to confusion, and may well be a promoter of harmony.

I have referred above to the rise of labour as the result of democracy, which in turn is the result of science. Has science produced, in the rise of labour, a disintegrating force in the Empire? Will the tie of class or the tie of race prove stronger? My answer would be as follows. At the present stage the result of science is to make class feeling more acute by giving to each section of society stronger weapons, to the capitalist far more wealth, to the worker far more knowledge and sense of strength. But look on once more. Let science have her perfect work. Again, as between white and coloured, so between employer and

employed, the sense of equality will supplant the irritating relation of superiority and inferiority; and with the growing sense of equality, race feeling and citizen feeling being based on nature must prove stronger than the feeling of class.

In this matter of the future of labour in regard to Empire, I attach much importance to the growth of universities and their increasing influence on the working classes. Too little, to my mind, has been made of last year's Congress of the Universities of the Empire, called together by the University of London. It will be borne in mind that the present President of the great American Republic was president of a university, and good authorities connect the rise of Germany in no small degree with the influence and the training of German universities. The modern features of universities are that they are increasingly democratic, that knowledge is specialised, that applied science, engineering, forestry, and the like is coming more and more to the front. At the annual dinner of the Royal Geographical Society the other evening, Sir Edward Grey and Lord Milner, either or both, used words to the effect

that "knowledge, scientific or other, had not much to do with acquisition of Empire, but it has everything to do with retaining it." The multiplication of universities in our Empire, coupled with their growing co-operation, is a tribute to science and to knowledge, and of the best omen for the future. "Knowledge," said Daniel Webster, "is the great sun in the firmament. Life and power are scattered with all its beams." To the work of science and to the spread of knowledge I look for the future of the British Empire.

V

THE COLONIAL REFORMERS OF 1830

V

THE COLONIAL REFORMERS OF 1830

BY PROFESSOR H. E. EGERTON, M.A.

THE course of lectures, in which I have been invited to take part, deals mainly with present day problems of the British Empire. I have to ask your indulgence whilst I deal, however imperfectly, with a chapter of history which, for good or for evil—and happily we may confidently affirm for good—seems now definitely closed; though the past still lives in its offspring—the self-governing British Empire of to-day.

I do not know if you have ever seriously considered what was the position of the British Colonies at the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. There has been some controversy over the question—how far Great Britain read the lesson of the loss of the American Colonies. It is, however, I think tolerably plain what view the British governing classes took of

the great disruption. In the first place, they knew, what historians have only recently learnt to appreciate, that it was not the absence of self-government which wrecked the first English Empire. Connecticut and Rhode Island under the old system had even more complete self-government than have the great Dominions of to-day. To the British statesmen of the time it seemed clear that the trouble had arisen from two main causes, the democratic character of the colonial constitutions, and the attempt to obtain from the Colonies an imperial revenue. Hence the ineffectual effort to stem the wave of advancing democracy by the Mother Partington's mop of a Canadian aristocracy; but hence, too, the determination to kill discontent by kindness; and to undergo on the Colonies' behalf that burden of expenditure, of which later we hear so much in Sir William Molesworth's speeches. In 1830 a Tory chancellor of the Exchequer proposed a Commission for the purpose of investigating colonial expenditure, and this is the comment of a distinguished soldier, Sir J. Willoughby Gordon,[1] when invited to take part in the inquiry: "The House of

[1] *The Taylor Papers*, p. 316.

Commons and the public have their attention very closely fixed upon the state of our Colonies; they have for years been made the scapegoat of our expenditure, and when we are now called upon to explain the reasons for keeping up our present military establishment, our answer is 'The Colonies, the Colonies.' There is no branch of the public service which has not a drain upon its resources from the Colonies; the Navy, the Army, the Ordnance, the Treasury, all and each are largely drawn upon by the Colonies through every department of which those great bodies are composed."

This, then, was the first objection to the new system of colonial administration—that it was very expensive, that it meant continuous drains upon the British taxpayer, on behalf of people who might well be able to pay for themselves. A second objection, no less formidable, was that it was essentially un-English, that it meant the triumph of that bureaucratic system of government which, at least till the twentieth century, was supposed to be anathema to the ordinary Briton. In their nervousness, Lord Durham contended, the Home Government would not give a free hand even to the British

representative on the spot; and so Parliament, and even the Parliamentary Secretary of State, having their hands full, power more and more gravitated to the unknown, irresponsible, permanent officials.

But worse was still behind. The old Empire had been founded in honour. It is true that there had been some transference of undesirables and criminals to the southern English provinces of North America; but such noxious weeds had soon been merged in the good seed surrounding them; and, upon the whole, it is fair to say that the American Colonies had been founded by the spirit of adventure, the spirit of loyalty to religious conviction, and the spirit of religious toleration, under the economic ægis of a self-sufficing Empire. Now, in the Southern Seas there had appeared the portentous growth of a colony founded and based upon the wreckage of human nature. New South Wales, according to Dean Hinds, had been "founded and maintained on principles which, if acted upon by an individual in private life, would expose him to the charge of insanity or of shameless profligacy. Imagine the case of a household most carefully made up of picked specimens from

all the idle, mischievous, and notoriously bad characters in the country! Surely the man who should be mad or wicked enough to bring together this monstrous family, and to keep up its numbers and character by fresh supplies, would be scouted from the society he so outraged —would be denounced as the author of a diabolical nuisance to his neighbourhood and his country, and would be proclaimed infamous for setting at nought all morality and decency. What is it better that, instead of a household, it is a whole people we have so brought together, and are so keeping up?—that it is the wide society of the whole world, and not of a single country, against which the nuisance is committed?"[1]

I have not time now to deal with the transportation system, or to explain the limitations within which it might have been tolerable. What we are concerned with here is the influence of the system upon the public opinion of the day regarding colonies; and on this point there can be no question. It caused the very word colony to stink in the nostrils of self-respecting men.

[1] Quoted by Gibbon Wakefield, *A View of the Art of Colonisation*, 1849, p. 117.

Here then was the situation in 1830. The old English colonial economic system in theory still held its ground, but the great growth of trade between Great Britain and the independent United States seemed to throw doubts on some of its most cherished doctrines, and under the gospel of reciprocity, as preached by Huskisson, colonies played a less leading part than they had played under the old system. But if colonies were no longer indispensable for reasons of trade; if, moreover, they were very costly and entailed a system of government odious to Englishmen, whilst the associations connected with them were largely those of failure and disgrace, was it unnatural that men should begin to ask themselves whether Great Britain would not be happier were she to rid herself of these ropes round her neck which threatened to strangle her?

Consider again the constitutional history of both the Canadas between 1816 and 1830, and then ask yourselves whether a colonial Empire could be deemed an unmixed blessing. In lower Canada, at any rate, there were, I know, faults on both sides; and, personally, I should hold Papineau and his followers more

to blame than the British governors and much more than the Home Government. Still, however brought about, the result was the same, one of difficulty and danger.

In my opinion one main cause of the loss of the American Colonies had been the conflict between political and social ideals on the two sides of the Atlantic and the contemptuous treatment of individual colonials by individual Englishmen. But on this point the English had learnt nothing by the great disaster. Hear what is said by Gibbon Wakefield: "When a person of any mark in any foreign country comes to London on a visit of curiosity, he has only to make known his arrival in order to receive all kinds of attentions from the circles whose civilities are most prized. . . . When a distinguished colonist comes to London—one even whose name stands as high in his own community as the leaders of the Government and opposition do here—he prowls about the streets, and sees sights till he is sick of doing nothing else, and then returns home disgusted with his visit to the old country."[1]

On grounds, then, economic, political, and

[1] *A View of the Art of Colonisation*, 1849, p. 147.

social, it might with confidence have been predicted that the old history would repeat itself, and that, when the new communities were sufficiently ripe, they would fall from the parent tree just as the American Colonies had justified the prescience of Turgot. That this natural tendency was arrested, that a new idea of an Empire at once self-governing in its component parts and yet one as against the outside world sprang into being, was due to the work of a small body of men of whom the leading mind was that of Edward Gibbon Wakefield.

No stranger figure nor one less characteristically English in every way could be found than that of Gibbon Wakefield. Born in 1796, of a good stock in which philanthropy was hereditary, he aspired for a time to be a diplomat and man of fashion. Married at twenty to a ward in chancery, and left a widower with two children, he sought to mend his fortunes by abducting a school-girl of means. A sentence of three years' imprisonment, which would have killed the spirit of many, proved the turning-point in Wakefield's career; for in the enforced leisure of confinement he wrote his *Letter from Sydney*, which

embodied the doctrines to promote which was henceforth to be the business of his life. The book appeared in 1829. As a *tour de force* it is amazing. The difficulties of a colonist of means, in the absence of labour, are so vividly depicted that they seem the outcome of personal experience. It is impossible here to discuss in detail Wakefield's central economic doctrine. He held, and convinced some of the wisest of his contemporaries, that the main cause of the slow growth of new communities was the scarcity of labour; and that this scarcity had been generally brought about by the reckless prodigality with which the public lands had been given away. Set a sufficient price upon the land, *i.e.* a price that would have the effect of compelling labourers to work some considerable time for wages before they could become landowners, whilst not making it impossible for them to attain to that position, and all would go well with a budding settlement. To the plain man in the street the benefit of the Wakefield system was that it afforded a welcome fund by which assisted emigration might be promoted; but Wakefield with a certain vein of pedantry asserted that the land should

be sold, even if the proceeds of the sale were thrown into the sea; still, he admitted that "if the object were the utmost possible increase of the population, wealth and greatness of our Empire, then I can have no doubt that the revenue accruing from the sale of waste land would be called an emigration fund, and be expended in conveying poor people of the labouring classes from the mother country to the Colonies."[1]

No single theory suits all occasions and circumstances; and the necessity of individual capitalist production, which Wakefield assumes as the starting-point of his system, may be questioned for the building up of a new community. At the same time, where the Wakefield system has had a fair trial as in the Canterbury settlement of New Zealand, it seems to have worked well; and he was assuredly right in protesting against the waste and jobbery which were indissolubly connected with the system of free grants. Still the consideration of the Wakefield system of the disposal of the public lands belongs to the professed economist, and inasmuch as it as-

[1] *A View of the Art of Colonisation*, p. 377.

sumed the retention of those lands in the hands of the mother country, was soon ruled out of court by the logic of events. What concerns to-day is not the technical details of Wakefield's teaching, but the new spirit which he breathed into colonial affairs, a spirit which found expression both in the foundation of new colonies and in the treatment of old ones.

In 1830 the Colonisation Society was founded. In Wakefield's words, "They were an unknown and feeble body, composed chiefly of very young men, some of whose names, however, soon ceased to be obscure, whilst others were amongst the most celebrated of their day. The outside number of the founders of the society did not pass a dozen, and the great public was either hostile or utterly indifferent to their views."[1] The list of the members as given by Wakefield in his *England and America*[2] contains some forty names, of whom six were members of Parliament. The ideas of the founders of the Colonisation Society of 1830 grew out of the proceedings of the British Government in settling the Swan

[1] *A View of the Art of Colonisation*, p. 40.
[2] Vol. ii. p. 161.

River or Western Australia. "The blind blundering at Swan River," Wakefield says, "directed attention rather to the means than to the objects of colonisation; but when the means at the disposal of this country had been weighed, the importance of the attainable objects was perceived; and thus at length a system was framed which embraced both objects and means. The means and the objects were not confounded, but first separated, and then brought together, compared, and fitted. The subject was further divided into two parts; into matters economical, such as the selection of poor emigrants, or the disposal of waste land, and into matters political, such as the effects of extensive colonisation on home politics, or the nature of colonial government. In a word, the colonisers of 1830 framed a theory."[1]

The special strong point of these colonial reformers was that they kept in mind two objects, which are generally left apart. In the first place, there was the condition of England question. If you have read Carlyle's *Latter-Day Pamphlets* or his *Past and Present*—and

[1] *A View of the Art of Colonisation*, p. 43.

remember that Carlyle was C. Buller's tutor—you will know how ominous seemed to generous minds the economic situation in the England of the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Industrialism, when it first developed on a great scale, without the restraints of Factory Acts, a proper standard of living, and efficient Trade Unions, seemed to open out an inferno of mammonism that could only end in revolution. Now it is perfectly true that emigration, on which Wakefield and Charles Buller laid such stress, was not by itself a real remedy. If you have a thousand people living in squalor on an area which will only hold six hundred, so as to secure a decent life, if you merely emigrate four hundred and leave the rest in the same social degradation in which they were before, they will merely draw to themselves new immigrants from the submerged. So true is it that when the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, unless his nature has been amended, the old enemy comes back with seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and the last state of that man is worse than the first. Still, granting the limitations within which emigration can work as a social remedy, within those limitations it is of

great value; and it was of the utmost significance that those who represented the imperial idea should have been also deeply in earnest regarding social reform.

Their second great aim was, you know, the expansion of England; its genuine expansion, by means of freely granting to the colonists those free institutions which were the proud heritage of the Englishman at home. If you ever have occasion to discuss the subject of imperialism with representatives of the latter-day labour party, you will find that they almost invariably take the line that it is idle to talk of a greater Britain, whilst the Britain with which we are immediately concerned is so lamentably lacking in the things which make for true greatness. From this point of view the position of the colonial reformers is one of extreme interest. They were, for the most part, reformers, not merely in matters relating to the Colonies; they were also strong radicals in home politics. The folly of his youth kept Gibbon Wakefield outside the inner circle of British politics; and his versatile, ingenious mind led him to agree with whoever should be able to further his schemes of coloni-

sation; but his main pupils, Buller, Molesworth, and Durham were strong radicals; and it was as a radical that John Stuart Mill, an original member of the Colonisation Society, gave his blessing on the movement.

Sir W. Molesworth was a strong party man and had expressed sympathy with the Canadian rebels; but this, as early as 1838, was his final opinion with regard to the Colonies: "A new dislike to the old system of colonial trade, and an impression made by the new system of colonial government, under which the evils and abuses, necessarily belonging to all government from a distance, had increased and become more obvious—these I believe to be at the bottom of the opinion which condemns as mischievous and absurd the old-fashioned but (as it appears to me) sound opinion which is expressed by the cry, 'Ships, colonies, commerce.' Instead of wishing to separate from our Colonies, or to avert the establishment of new ones, I would say, distinguish between the evil and the good; remove the evil but preserve the good; do not 'emancipate your Colonies'; but multiply them and improve—reform your system of colonial government. Sir, I yield to no man in

a desire to preserve and extend the colonial empire of England. I wish that our connection with the United States had not been dissolved; because one may suppose that, if it had been preserved, slavery in America would by this time have been abolished, and the American tariff would never have existed. While, on the other hand, I rejoice at the separation, it is only because I prefer the lesser evil; believing that the colonists, after our tyrannical attack on their local constitutional rights, had no choice but between independence and abject submission to our power; and that the triumph of our tyranny in America would have been a misfortune to the world. It is, sir, on the same principle, while I wish that our connection with lower Canada were more intimate and more friendly than it has ever been, that I hope that the people of that country will either recover the Constitution which we have violated, or become wholly independent of us. However strong my impressions may be of the advantages of colonial empire, yet I sincerely trust that I shall ever sympathise with a people struggling for their just rights, and heartily wish them success."[1]

[1] *Selected Speeches of Sir W. Molesworth*, 1903, pp. 11, 12.

Now I have quoted all this, not because I think that the opinions of Molesworth with regard to the American Revolution or the Canadian Rebellion are of importance, formed as they were with no inside knowledge, and under the influence of strong *à priori* prejudice; but because they bring out very strongly the double aspect of the whole movement. Wakefield himself declared that the authors of his economic theory attached the highest importance to the subject of government, believing that the best economical arrangements would not work well without provisions for a good political government of the colonists.

In one sense this was the tragedy of the whole movement, because whilst its economic theory required for its assertion the maintenance of the directing hand of the central government, its political ideal required that there should be complete local self-government; and it was unthinkable that a self-governing community should be long content without the control of its own public lands. In Herman Merivale's words, "The ingenious and able school of the colonial reformers of 1840–50 overdid their own work. They wished to promote colonial inde-

pendence. They wished also to promote their favourite experiments in colonisation. But the two purposes were in truth incompatible. The emancipated legislatures soon endeavoured to appropriate the land revenue as their first prize, and the Home Government did not find it worth while to make any serious opposition."[1] This is perfectly true; but Herman Merivale hardly seems to realise how vital a part of the whole system was what he somewhat infelicitously calls "colonial independence."

The Colonisation Society was hardly started, when its member's idea of not granting the colonial lands for nothing was, to some extent at least, adopted by the government. The Regulations of 1831 no doubt owed their origin to the influence exercised by Wakefield upon the mind of Lord Howick, the future Lord Grey, who was at the time Under Secretary for the Colonies. They required that the lands should be sold by auction at a minimum upset price, and that the resulting revenue should be applied to the emigration of females. By these means over £42,000 was expended in the years 1832–36 in the emigration of nearly 3000

[1] *Colonisation and Colonies.* Note at p. 435 of edition of 1861.

women. Emigration commissioners were also appointed in 1831 with general superintendence of all matters relating to that subject. Lastly, in 1840, a new Land and Emigration Board was set on foot; the instructions issued to whom by Lord John Russell containing, according to Charles Buller, "an admirable view of the general duties of a government with regard to colonisation."[1] When it is further noted that the principle of the obligatory sale of the Australian public lands was embodied in an imperial Act in 1842, it would, on the surface, seem that the colonial reformers had been singularly successful. In fact, however, the fastidious and critical temperament of Wakefield saw not a little to disapprove in the clumsy and sometimes half-hearted attempts of British officials to make use of his artillery. Against Lord Grey especially he had some personal grievance, with results disastrous to his own undertakings, as well as to his own personal dignity.

Be this as it may, from the first the colonial reformers were not content with the partial

[1] Speech on "Systematic Colonisation" reprinted in *A View of the Art of Colonisation*, p. 485.

conversion of public men to their economic theories, they sought by the creation of a new colony to give actual embodiment to their ideals. So long as the canker of transportation was at work in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, it seemed hopeless to expect much from a better administration of the land question in those Colonies; but there were still portions of that island continent where no convict had entered; and why should not a new Colony, under new methods, in that quarter of the world show the possibilities of a better day? Under these expectations South Australia was founded. South Australia was at the time a nameless desert, about which nothing was known by the public or the Government. The first attempt at settlement ended in failure, because the Ministry refused a charter of incorporation, the consequence of which would have been a measure of self-government.

"As we could not move an inch," wrote Wakefield some years later, "without the sanction of the Colonial office, we now resolved to abandon the political part of our scheme in the hope of being enabled to realise the economical part. . . . Somehow or other, though not with-

out many a squeak for its life, we got the South Australia Bill into the House of Lords. A prince of the blood asked, 'Pray, where is this South Australia?' and the Lord Chancellor, renowned for the surpassing extent and variety of his knowledge, answered, 'Somewhere near Botany Bay.' There was, moreover, in the House of Lords an active opposition which threatened to prove fatal, because, though it was confined to a few peers, not a single one except the proposer of the Bill had any active goodwill towards our measure. . . . In this extremity, one of us thought of endeavouring to interest the Duke of Wellington in our favour. He assiduously examined our plan, came to the conclusion that 'the experiment ought to be tried,' and then with a straightforward earnestness that belongs to his nature, and with a prompt facility for which his great personal influence accounts, lifted our poor measure above all obstacles."[1] The South Australia Act, even in the opinion of its authors, was defective in many points, and contained some wholly bad provisions. As the result of meeting objections, the original plan

[1] *A View of the Art of Colonisation*, pp. 47, 48.

was so disfigured that only the most capable administration could have enabled it to work. But here, unhappily, failure was inevitable, because, in the words of the Parliamentary Committee of 1841, the powers of administration were so parted between the governor and council, who possessed the executive, legislative, and taxing powers, and a Board of Commissioners, who had the disposal of the public lands and the employment of the emigration fund raised thereby, that these powers could not be effectually exercised by either. "According to the manner," Wakefield told that committee, "I will not say the system, in which South Australia has been governed and colonised, everybody seems to have been relieved from responsibility to anybody."

I have not time here, to-day, to deal with the fortunes of South Australia; but it is only fair to note that, so far as it was a failure, such failure was due to a departure from, not an adherence to, Wakefield's system; and that, in a wider sense, the Colony was by no means a failure; and though it cost the Home Government something before it realised its intention of being entirely self-supporting, still such cost

was small compared with the experience of former Colonies.

But South Australia was not the only British Colony which was directly due to the colonial reformers. In 1836 a House of Commons, under the chairmanship of Mr. Henry George Ward, considered the whole question of colonisation, and issued a report which had a considerable effect in spreading a knowledge of the subject. One of the members of this committee was Mr. Francis Baring, and it was at his instigation that the New Zealand Association of 1837 was formed with the intent of founding that Colony. Unhappily the association found themselves confronted with a formidable opposition. The whole weight of the powerful missionary interest was thrown into the scale against the annexation and colonisation of the islands. The missionaries, shocked by the kind of Europeans who were already on the spot, desired the maintenance of New Zealand as a Maori preserve under the patriarchal rule of wise missionaries. The Secretary of State, Lord Glenelg, was much under the influence of the missionaries; and, in addition, distrusted new Colonies, as likely to

excite the jealousy of foreign Powers, and as very expensive to govern and manage. In this state of opinion the New Zealand Association found it very difficult to make headway. They were offered a charter if they would become a joint-stock company, trading for profit. In despair they accepted this offer, only to find new pitfalls placed in their way. At last, tired out by their treatment by the Ministry, they decided to take the bull by the horns, and consider New Zealand as a no man's land, free to all comers.

That they were wrong in pouring immigrants into the Colony before that they could be provided with land is certain; but, on the other hand, it is pretty clear that such hasty action forced the hands of the British Government in formally annexing the island, and may thus have been the means of saving New Zealand for the British Empire. Time forbids to enter into the squalid controversy between the New Zealand Company and the Home Government, and between the Wellington settlers and the colonial authorities. It is enough to say that the right thing, namely, the vindication of the natives' rights to their lands, was done in the

very worst way through the delay which occurred and the distress occasioned to *bonâ fide* settlers; the final conclusion being that the New Zealand Company came to a somewhat inglorious end. Nevertheless, it had done much. It had founded important settlements at the south end of the north island; and, by means of subsidiary associations, it had brought into being the Church Colonies of Otago and Canterbury.

Nothing was more remarkable in the remarkable career of Wakefield than the manner in which he, a virtual sceptic, sought to revive under new conditions the old spirit of religious colonisation which had been the secret of New England's strength. *Idem velle de rebus sacris* as well as *de re publicâ*, this had given to Massachusetts a cohesive force without a parallel in history. It may seem ludicrous to suppose that the same results could be obtained in the case of members of the Scottish Free Church, or in that of English High-Churchmen, in the less strenuous environment of a latitudinarian century. Nevertheless the experiment was by no means a failure, and secured for the two infant colonies of Otago and Canterbury

such types of settlers as have seldom watched over the beginnings of new colonies.

Canterbury was the last direct attempt of the colonial reformers in the way of empire-building. Durham had died in 1840. The brilliant and practical Charles Buller had also died prematurely in 1848, just when men were beginning to realise that wit and brilliance were not incompatible with the quality of solid common sense. Sir William Molesworth lived to become a new Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1855; but the cause of colonial reform had no sooner triumphed than his death put an end for many years to its hopes. Gibbon Wakefield himself lingered on as a New Zealand citizen till 1862, but his last years were a living death, and he was an extinct volcano from December 1854. The colonial reformers had for the time played their part. The Manchester School, which for many years represented the most active type of radicalism, was openly hostile to their ideas; and it was not till a later date that Liberal imperialists of the type of Lord Rosebery and Mr. W. E. Forster were to renew under more favourable auspices the beliefs of the first pioneers.

I have spoken of the work of the colonial reformers in infusing a new spirit into beliefs with regard to the Colonies, of their methods of dealing with the colonial public lands, and of promoting emigration, and lastly, of their experiments in the task of empire-building; it remains to say a few words respecting their attitude towards colonial self-government. In many books and speeches you will find it said that responsible government was granted to the Colonies with the deliberate intention of making it a half-way house towards total separation. Whatever may have been the secret beliefs and expectations of leading public men—and in this connection it is fair to note that Lord Grey, who was Colonial Secretary through the eventful years 1846–52, declared his unshaken faith in the permanence of the Empire—it is impossible to deny that the English statesman who first brought responsible government within the range of practical politics was precisely the statesman who was most profoundly possessed with the idea of a greater Britain. If you are familiar with the language of Lord Durham, you will forgive me once more recalling to your attention words which age cannot

wither nor custom stale: "The mismanagement by which the resources of our Colonies have hitherto been wasted has, I know, produced in the public mind too much of a disposition to regard them as mere sources of corruption and loss, and to entertain with too much complacency the idea of abandoning them as useless. I cannot participate in the notion that it is the part either of prudence or of honour to abandon our countrymen, when our government of them has plunged them into disorder, or our territory, when we discover that we have not turned it to proper account. The experiment of keeping Colonies and governing them well, ought at least to have a trial, ere we abandon for ever the vast dominion which might supply the wants of our surplus population, and raise up millions of fresh consumers of our manufactures, and producers of a supply of our wants. The warmest admirers and the strongest opponents of republican institutions admit or assert that the amazing prosperity of the United States is less owing to their form of government than to the unlimited supply of fertile land, which maintains succeeding generations in an undiminishing affluence of fertile

soil. A region as large and as fertile is open to your Majesty's subjects in your Majesty's American dominions. The recent improvements in the means of communication will in a short time bring the unoccupied lands of Canada and New Brunswick within as easy reach of the British Isles as the Territories of Iowa and Wisconsin are of that incessant emigration that annually quits New England for the Far West.

"I see no reason, therefore, for doubting that by good government, and the adoption of a sound system of colonisation" (note with the colonial reformers how the two things always go hand in hand), "the British possessions in North America may thus be made the means of conferring on the suffering classes of the mother country many of the blessings which have hitherto been supposed to be peculiar to the social state of the new world."[1] No one who has ever paid any attention to the doings or sayings of Lord Durham will doubt the literal sincerity of the assertion in the last sentence of his report, that it had been dictated "by the earnest desire to perpetuate and

[1] *Lord Durham's Report on British North America.* Edited by Sir C. Lucas, vol. ii. p. 331.

strengthen the connection between this Empire and the North American Colonies, which would then form one of the brightest ornaments in your Majesty's imperial Crown."

No doubt the report, no less than Durham himself, had the defects of its qualities. In his almost arrogant advocacy of complete colonial self-government, he ignored the difficulties in the way of the working of the system of party government in a new country like Canada consisting of two races, difficulties which the subsequent constitutional history of Canada was to bring to the front. Sir Charles Lucas has conclusively shown that, while Durham was counting on the imperial possession of the public lands for the full realisation of his reforms, the Home Government had already, for all practical purposes, parted with its interests to lower Canada. Durham believed, like Molesworth after him, that it was a simple matter to say beforehand what were imperial concerns and what were local; but if you consider what were the points he deemed essential to be reserved for the imperial authority, you will once more note the fallibility of human judgments. First, there was the subject of the control of the

colonial public lands. Whatever our opinion in the abstract of Durham's view, that they were "the rightful patrimony of the English people, the ample appanage, which God and nature have set aside in the new world for those whose lot has assigned them an insufficient portion in the old"; or of Lord Grey's subsequent claim, that the waste lands of the vast colonial possessions of the British Empire were held by the Crown as trustee for the inhabitants of that Empire at large, and not for the inhabitants of the particular province, divided by arbitrary geographical limits in which any waste land happened to be situated,—in fact, it proved impossible to make good such claims without imperilling the continuance of the imperial connection. Again, Durham recognised that the enforcement of trade regulations belonged to the imperial authority; but, from 1858 onwards, the right of self-governing Colonies to regulate their own fiscal concerns in their own way has been in practice recognised, there being no answer to Galt's objection that otherwise the power of local taxation would rest with the imperial government. Of his other reservations, "the constitution of the form of government" has

been practically conceded to the Commonwealth of Australia, and would be conceded to the Dominion of Canada were she to ask for it; and even with regard to the "regulation of foreign relations," we have heard in these latter days from the lips of a distinguished Canadian statesman the strange doctrine of a possible Canadian neutrality in the event of an imperial war. That the doctrine could be defended on mere legal grounds is more than doubtful, but that it should be formulated by a responsible public man is none the less significant. If Durham seriously believed that it was possible to say to the waves of great advancing communities, "Thus far shall you go and no further," he has been proved to be wrong. If the unity of the Empire is to be preserved, it must be by means other than such formal regulations. To pursue this subject, however, would be to plunge into waters deeper than those dealt with by my present lecture; and to suggest that a document like the Durham Report has a double meaning, and may be regarded not merely as the goal of a definite colonial policy, but, spiritually taken, as the starting-point of a new conception of the British Empire.

Because, when all is said and ended, it is in that word "spirit" that is revealed the whole strength of the movement, with which this afternoon we have been occupied. The causes of the loss of the American Colonies were no doubt complex and numerous; but the fundamental cause was, I am convinced, the lack of imagination, the inability to see visions, the hard, dry materialism which looked for immediate returns in £ *s.* and *d.* If you have ever glanced through Dean Tucker's very able Tracts on the American difficulty, you will have realised in its extreme form the little Englandism with which the sane imperialist is always at war. But if the first Empire was largely lost by lack of imagination, that loss was not calculated to encourage idealism. Henceforth, in the decay of mercantilism, the idea of a colonial Empire drifted on the waters, like some ship riddled by its enemies' guns, that floats on a calm sea, ready at the first storm to break up. In America, the backward political condition of Lower Canada and the imperial fidelity of the United Empire Loyalists gave a breathing time during which statesmen might consider the ways belonging to their peace.

Of extreme significance, from my present point of view, was the establishment in 1788 of New South Wales as a mere convict settlement. Whatever may be said in favour of transportation as a punishment within certain well-defined limits, there can be no question that the creation of a community wholly based upon criminal foundations did, in the words of the House of Commons Committee Report of 1838, involve "the curious and monstrous evil of calling into existence and continually extending societies, or the germs of nations most thoroughly depraved as respects both the character and degree of their vicious propensities." It is, I think, amongst the most marvellous instances of the *vis medicatrix naturæ* how little Australia in the end suffered from this original wrong (whether without transportation she would ever have taken a start as a free community is another question); but the woe is none the less on those who cynically exposed its beginnings to such trials. Assuredly, unless public opinion with regard to imperial obligations had been wholly blunted, the practice of such cynicism could never have been tolerated.

Nor, when better motives were at work, was

the actual outcome much more encouraging. The whole history of the divisions between British and Dutch in South Africa takes its origin from opposing views with regard to the natives. The British Government was well-meaning and conscientious in its support of the missionaries; but too often its decisions showed ignorance, as well as want of tact, and the missionaries themselves were sometimes unfortunate in their methods of advocating a good cause. Whatever else the dominions of philanthropists effected, it did not make for the friendly working of imperial relations.

Meanwhile, as we have seen, the huge cost entailed upon the British taxpayer by the existence of colonies was giving occasion for enemies to blaspheme, whilst it disheartened even sincere imperialists.

It was upon this scene of low ideals and practical difficulties that the colonial reformers entered in 1830; and it is not too much to say that at once the imperial horizon was widened, and a return seemed again possible to the spacious days of great Elizabeth. It was said of Lord Palmerston, rightly or wrongly matters not, that the tone of British public life fell

under him? assuredly, wherever the colonial reformers touched contemporary politics, there was imparted to them a new meaning and a new dignity. To Wakefield himself, writing in 1848, it might seem that there was no part of the colonial Empire of Britain, no portion of the colonising proceedings of the mother country apart from government, still less any instance of colonial government, which the theorists of 1830 could regard without disappointment and regret. But it must be remembered that Wakefield was, unfortunately, an embittered man; and in that same year, 1848, Durham's son-in-law, Lord Elgin, first gave complete acceptance, as Governor-General of Canada, to that system of responsible government of which Durham had been the forerunner. In Elgin's letters we have the quintessence of the views of the colonial reformers. "No matter," he wrote, "how raw and rude a territory may be when it is admitted as a state into the Union of the United States, it is at once by the popular belief invested with all the dignity of manhood, and introduced into a system which . . . every American believes and maintains to be immortal. But how does the

case stand with us? No matter how great the advance of a British Colony in wealth and civilisation; no matter how absolute the powers of self-government conceded to it—it is still taught to believe that it is in a condition of pupilage from which it must pass before it can attain maturity. For one, I have never been able to comprehend why, elastic as our constitutional system is, we should not be able . . . to render the links which bind them to the British Crown at least as lasting as those which unite the component parts of the Union. . . . One thing is, however, indispensable to the success of this or any other system of colonial government. You must renounce the habit of telling the Colonies that the colonial is a provisional existence. You must allow them to believe that without severing the bonds which unite them to Great Britain they may attain the degree of perfection and of social and political development to which organised communities of free men have a right to aspire."[1]

In the beginning of this lecture I sought to justify my choice of a subject, side by side

[1] *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin.* Edited by T. Walrond, 1873, p. 116.

with others of more practical interest, on the ground that the colonial reformers built the foundations on which the whole fabric of the self-governing Empire now rests. In this state of things it is surely right for the most practical of us, those most immersed in the problems of the present, to turn for a moment a reverent gaze to the rock whence they were hewn and the pit whence they were dug. Without piety, in the Roman sense of the word, no race can endure; and without knowledge, national piety is impossible.

VI

THE PROBLEM OF AN IMPERIAL EXECUTIVE

VI

THE PROBLEM OF AN IMPERIAL EXECUTIVE

BY SIDNEY LOW, M.A.

THE question of an Empire executive is intimately bound up with that of the Empire constitution. Burke, in his speech on American Taxation in April 1774, said: "Every Englishman ought not only to know the principles of the constitution of his country, but also to know the principles of the constitution of the British Empire." But what is the constitution of the British Empire? De Tocqueville, after a prolonged attempt to discover what the English constitution was, impatiently declared that there was no such thing; the English constitution, he said, *n'existe point*; by which he meant that it was too informal, irregular, and contradictory to be reduced to a system. He might have been better justified

if he had been dealing not with the United Kingdom but with the larger association of kingdom, states, and dependencies which forms the realm of Britain. "Every Englishman" does not perhaps understand how loose is the union of that realm, how few are the institutions and constitutional organs which serve the whole and are in some sort common to all.

There is no common government; there is no common legislature; there is no common financial, fiscal, or legal system; there is no common army, or even as yet a common navy; there is no kind of political machinery which is common to all the members, there is only, in a very restricted sense, a common citizenship; nor, of course, is there community of language, race, religion, or social customs. Voltaire said that the Holy Roman Empire was so called because it was not holy, it was not Roman, and it was not an empire. A cynical critic might say that the term "British Empire" is not much more accurately descriptive. It is not an empire in the sense in which the word could have been applied to the Roman or the Spanish dominions in the past, or to those of Germany or Russia in the present. It is, in fact, a political

aggregation or collection, including one centralised kingdom in Europe, several self-governing states of which the three largest approximate to the character of federal republics, a gigantic Asiatic subject-realm, and a number of dependent territories and islands scattered over the continents and oceans of the world.

How few are the organs and institutions which serve or apply equally to these units. Are there more than two which in fact as well as theory belong to all alike, to India and the island of Ascension, to Lancashire and Labrador? One is the Crown, which is technically supreme in the whole fabric, and actually in constitutional or administrative relations with every part. The King-Emperor is sovereign throughout the entire Weltreich; the one formal tie between its native born or naturalised inhabitants is, that they all owe him allegiance, they are all British subjects. The second imperial organ is that which represents the Crown in its international relations, the Foreign Office. His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs speaks to the world at large on behalf of all the peoples whom the King rules; foreign governments are entitled to treat the King's

empire as one, except in so far as they have agreed to recognise local divisions for commercial purposes. These two, then, the Monarchy and the Foreign Office, seem to be the only perfect and complete imperial organs we possess. There are others which may be called in some sense imperial, since they are extra-national and concern several of the constituent countries and peoples. Such is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which is the Crown in its capacity of supreme dispenser of justice. Before long we may expect the Committee to be amalgamated with the House of Lords in its judicial capacity; and when that is done we shall possess a true imperial court, to which in the last resort every litigant in the British Dominions—European, Asiatic, African, American, or Australasian—will have the right of appeal: a legal tribunal which may well claim to be the most august and authoritative in the world. And we have now two new organs of Empire in the Imperial Conference and the Imperial Defence Committee.

But the Empire as a whole still stands outside the formal constitution. There is no supreme

governing power in fact. In theory there is such a power. The Parliament of this kingdom is technically the sovereign law-making authority for the whole Empire; it is called the "Imperial Parliament," though that is a title which seems a misnomer to our fellow subjects in the self-governing dominions. "At one time," said Mr. Borden, the Canadian premier, speaking on 16th July 1912 at a dinner given within the palace of Westminster itself, "this mother of parliaments was in truth and in fact an Imperial Parliament in the highest sense. If I understand correctly the conditions of to-day, that status has ceased to exist. A parliament elected upon issues chiefly, if not altogether, local and domestic, a parliament which expends so large a portion of its time and energies in discussing and determining questions of purely domestic concern, can hardly be regarded as an Imperial Parliament in the highest or truest sense." In so speaking, Mr. Borden unquestionably expressed the opinion of those who have thought most upon these matters in the Oversea States. The view of the colonial constitutionalists is to be found in Mr. Keith's great book on *Responsible Govern-*

ment in the Dominions, and in Alpheus Todd's *Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies*, the work of a most learned Canadian lawyer and historian, which ought to be better known and more closely studied than it is in this country. The conception which runs through Mr. Todd's pages—a conception which would be unhesitatingly accepted by most Canadians and Australasians—is that of an equality of status among the parliaments of the Empire under the Crown. The parliaments of Canada and Australia are not subordinate to the parliament of the United Kingdom, but co-ordinate with it; each is sovereign, if that is the correct term, within its own sphere. In fact, the self-governing states are in a political sense equals; they are all partners on the same basis of independent rights; the British ministry has no more claim to authority over the ministry of Newfoundland than the governor of the state of New York in the American Union has over the governor of Nebraska.

But this equality is not complete either in theory or ill practice. The Imperial Parliament has never formally abandoned its supremacy. It can still legally pass acts which

are operative throughout the King's dominions; it might if it pleased regulate the marriage laws in Australia or the system of land tenure in Ontario. No doubt it is said that this nominal right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the sister-states is unimportant, since it will never again be used. But that must be accepted with some qualification. The King acts in England on the responsible advice of his English committee of the Privy Council called the Cabinet, as he acts through his vicegerent in Canada on that of his Canadian Privy Council, and in Australia on that of his Australian Cabinet. But on whose advice does he act in transactions in which England, Canada, and Australia are alike concerned? Who are his advisers for imperial affairs? Here he relies upon a single executive, which is responsible only to the electorate of one among the cluster of self-governing peoples. When the Empire is to be committed to peace or war, or some momentous diplomatic negotiation is to be undertaken, it is the prime minister of the United Kingdom with whom the decision rests. If a great accession of new territory is to be acquired or re-organised, it is the Home

Government that makes the necessary arrangements. The whole of the dependent peoples, that is to say a fourth or a fifth of the human race, are controlled by two members of the British Cabinet. The navy of Britain, on which every state in the Empire relies for protection, is still in the main supported by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom; it is manned by sailors drawn from these islands, it is managed by a board of English officers who are under the direction of a Minister accountable only to the English Parliament. The prerogatives, the duties, and the burdens of this aggregation of free, self-governing, British communities, are mainly concentrated upon one of them. The fifteen or sixteen millions of the oversea Britons are spectators of the drama of Empire in which the actors are the other forty-five millions of Britons in the European islands. The system has been called one of limited liability. But the liability is not so much limited as indefinite. No party to this loose arrangement has that complete control over its own actions which a modern democratic nation desires; nor do they all share in the inheritance, whether it be one of privilege

or of obligation, which was acquired by the ancestors of all.

It seems unlikely that this constitution of the Empire can be final. As long as the oversea countries were in the pioneering stage, fully occupied in establishing themselves solidly in their new territories, and in building the framework of a civilised society in the wilderness, they were well content to be kept free from the international and other complications of the older community. On the other side, Great Britain, engaged in the most tremendous industrial movement the world has known, and in the incorporation of immense territories in Asia, expected no aid from the sparsely-peopled colonial settlements, and hoped only that they would make no inconvenient demands upon her attention or her resources. The warning of the American revolt had impressed itself perhaps too strongly upon the imagination of our politicians. It was assumed that the "natural destiny" of a colony was to achieve complete independence as soon as it was able to stand alone: the ripe fruit was bound to drop from the parent tree. This view of the case is plainly expressed by Lord Blachford,

that able and conscientious Liberal administrator who held responsible posts at Downing Street between 1850 and 1871. Writing towards the close of his life he said:

"I had always believed—and the belief has so confirmed and consolidated itself that I can hardly realise the possibility of any one seriously thinking the contrary—that the destiny of our Colonies is independence; and that, in this point of view, the function of the Colonial Office is to secure that our connection, while it lasts, shall be as profitable to both parties, and our separation when it comes, as amicable as possible."

This was almost the orthodox faith among influential circles of serious-thinking Englishmen at home. The less serious regarded the Colonies as remote countries, inhabited by persons of imperfect manners, to which undesirable relatives could be shipped in the hope (too often frustrated) that they would stay there. The belief in colonial separatism was not, as is sometimes said, confined to the Liberals and the Benthamites. It was held by some leading men of all parties in the earlier portion of the nineteenth century, and at the time it seemed

plausible enough. Even those who questioned it were content to acquiesce in the system of quasi-independence and undefined central control which has grown up.

Recent events have given us abundant cause to recognise manifold inconveniences and dangers in this situation. It is no longer suited to the conditions of the world in which we live. It gives all parts of the British Empire at once too much and too little, and it does not adequately provide for common action in regard to common interests. Of these, of course, the first is defence against external aggression. Up till a very few years ago the whole burden of the naval armaments fell upon the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. This could be endured so long as there was only one foreign navy which could be regarded as a formidable rival. Since the number of the great maritime Powers has been increased to seven or eight, while new and more costly instruments of war have been adopted, it is felt that the burden should be shared by the Britons overseas, if not indeed to some extent by the peoples of the dependent territories. Matched against its neighbours, its rivals, its possible enemies, the United King-

dom is a comparatively small country. We are but forty-six millions against the sixty-seven millions of Germany, the hundred millions of the United States, the hundred and sixty millions of Russia. But taking the Empire as a whole we have a population which goes far beyond any of those mentioned. Whatever may be the worth, for this purpose, of our Asiatic and African fellow-subjects (and I, personally, think their worth is great), we have some fifteen or sixteen millions of European blood and race in the self-governing States, which may be forty millions before the middle of this century, and who knows how many millions at its close. It is hardly disputed that the resources of this energetic and prosperous population should be, and will be, drawn upon for the support of the imperial sea-force. It is equally indisputable that the colonial contributions—whatever form they may eventually take—will carry with them a right to some share in controlling naval policy and organisation. If we have an imperial fleet, we shall obviously have an imperial Admiralty.

Defence and armaments are intimately associated with foreign policy. The Foreign

Office, as I have pointed out, is in a sense one of our imperial organs since, to alien governments at least, it represents not the nation but the Empire. Nevertheless this office is an exclusively national institution. And it is not only national; it is a department of the national government. Its chief is a member of the British ministry which depends for its existence on the support of the predominant party in the House of Commons. Of recent years it has been recognised that foreign affairs ought to be held, as far as possible, aloof from the party controversies. But it is not always possible to keep the home and foreign policy of a ministry locked in water-tight compartments, particularly when any real question of principle arises, such as that which divided Liberals and Conservatives over the Eastern Question between 1874 and 1880. And in any case the Foreign Secretary is involved in the fortunes and the projects of his colleagues, he must stand or fall with his party and his chief.

The peoples of the Dominions are keenly conscious of the party complexion of the imperial Ministry. But even if that Ministry were freed from all suspicion of partisanship,

it would still be British. It may, and often does, consult the statesmen of the Dominions on foreign affairs, but it is not bound to concur in their opinions. It can commit the States to responsibilities they dislike or compel them to incur risks they would prefer to avoid. Dr. Lawrence has shown that the Colonies cannot hope to escape from the liabilities of any war in which this country may be engaged. One part of the Empire cannot be at peace and another at war at the same time. The contrary doctrine has sometimes been put forward in a tentative fashion in the Dominions, as when, for instance, Sir Wilfred Laurier has seemed to claim for Canada the right of deciding whether it will take part in a conflict in which the mother country is engaged or remain neutral.

This, however, is an untenable proposition; and the present Canadian premier in the Dominion House of Commons has recently pointed out that Canada could only remain neutral in time of war by declaring her independence. The Empire's wars are Canada's wars; and since she must be a partner in their dangers and burdens she may claim some voice in framing the policy from which they spring. There

has been a rapid movement of opinion in this direction. The idea that "His Majesty's Government" at home could consent to discuss foreign policy with His Majesty's Governments overseas is very recent. At the Imperial Conference of 1911, Mr. Asquith urged that Sir Joseph Ward's proposals for an imperial representative council would impair the authority of the Cabinet of the United Kingdom in the conduct of foreign policy, the negotiation of treaties, the maintenance of peace, and the declaration of war. "That authority," the Prime Minister insisted, "cannot be shared." But a year later there was a considerable advance towards sharing it, since the Colonial Premiers visiting London in 1912 were called to a private session by the Foreign Secretary, and received full and confidential communications from him on the state of international affairs. It was after this visit that Mr. Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, on 5th December 1912, made the following remarks in the Dominion Parliament: "It has been declared in the past, and even during recent years, that the responsibility for foreign policy could not be shared by Great Britain with the Dominions. In my humble

opinion adherence to such a position could have but one, and that a most disastrous, result." He added: "It is satisfactory to know to-day that not only His Majesty's ministers, but also the leaders of the opposite political party in Great Britain, have explicitly accepted this principle, and have affirmed their conviction that the means by which it can be constitutionally accomplished must be sought, discovered, and utilised." We may then, I think, assume that the consensus of responsible opinion, both at home and overseas, is in favour of a genuinely imperial Foreign Office as well as an imperial Admiralty.

A share in imperial defence and imperial policy are two of the demands which may be legitimately made by our white fellow-subjects and fellow-citizens in the Dominions. A third is a share in the control and management of the Dependencies. I am far from believing that in its ultimate form the Empire Constitution will leave those territories with their vast populations in a condition of permanent subjection. I am convinced that some polity will eventually shape itself which will give to the peoples of India, with their acute intelligence,

their capacity for culture and progress, their well-developed civilisation older than our own, some effective voice not only in the governance of India but in the governance of the Empire. I even hope that it may be found possible to grant similar opportunities in some measure to a portion at least of our African fellow-subjects. But fortunately for all of us that enormously difficult factor in the problem of reconciling *Imperium et Libertas* can be left to a future beyond the reach of the present generation. For many years to come the tropical and sub-tropical peoples must be content, in their own interests much more than ours, to live under that benevolent and carefully tempered despotism which has rescued them from anarchy and maintained them in peace and security. For many years to come they will continue to be the subjects of our Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Celtic democracy. But why of only a section of that democracy, even though it be the largest? If we say, as we do constantly, that India has been acquired and Africa exploited by the wisdom and the valour of our fathers, were not these men also the fathers of the Englishmen

beyond the seas? Our Asiatic Empire is under the direction of a minister who is responsible to the parliament and the constituencies of these islands; but he stands apart from the parliaments and the constituencies of the other States. He is amenable, more or less, to the control of the electors of Battersea, but not to the electors of Melbourne or Montreal.

The advantages, such as they are, of our connection with the subject-territories, accrue to the people of the mother country alone; a vast sum—it has been authoritatively put as high as ten millions per annum[1]—is drawn from the population of the tropical and sub-tropical dependencies to remunerate their white officials and defenders. Those millions, hardly and meritoriously earned of course, go to pay the salaries of Englishmen from home; it is the Englishman from home who returns to confer upon our insular politics and society the benefit of his valuable experience in practical administration. The democracies of the South and West should have the same opportunity for enlarging their ideas and correcting any

[1] Amery, *Union and Strength.*

tendency to provincial crudity of thought, by sending their own able men to serve side by side with Englishmen and Scotsmen and Irishmen and Welshmen in India, in Egypt, in the Sudan, in Nigeria, in British East Africa. The services would gain by an admixture of officials who had not all been trained in a limited number of English schools and colleges. I remember once in India discussing certain administrative grievances with an Englishman who did not belong to the ruling bureaucracy, and he said: "This Empire is suffering from an overdose of the Oxford manner." I have never been able to discover what the Oxford manner is; but I suppose my friend meant that there were too many officials who had been trained in a limited number of English schools and colleges. The Oxford and Cambridge first-classmen and "blues" would have something to receive from colleagues from the prairie and the veldt if also something to impart to them. In the difficult task of ruling Oriental or semi-civilised peoples, we need the youthful energy of the young countries as well as the sober maturity of the old. At present it is the weary Titan at

home on whose shoulders the whole weight is poised. If rebellion or civil war should break out in any of our territories the duty of suppressing it rests with the Home Government. The Dominions, no doubt, would help by sending men to join the British armies, as they did in South Africa; but such aid could not be demanded as of right unless the oversea States had a measure of control, unless they shared the responsibility of the policy which had perhaps caused the crisis, unless they were made parties to the settlement. As we stand, it is the Home Government alone which decides, and the home population which alone can be compelled to enforce the decision.

There is another aspect of this matter. We are all agreed that the states of the Empire are to regulate their internal affairs. But who regulates those affairs which affect more than one state, where perhaps a clash of interests or sentiment may arise? Suppose that one government passes a law or adopts a policy which is resented, rightly or wrongly, by the government and the inhabitants of some other colony or dependency? Here is clearly a case where the prerogative of the Crown, as the

supreme authority in the Empire, may be invoked. The King might disallow the colonial statute or ordinance, or he might direct the executive of the dependency concerned to ignore it. But on whose advice could this grave action be taken? As things stand it could only be on that of the English ministry, the domestic cabinet, as the colonists consider it, of the people of the United Kingdom. It is a serious responsibility for this Cabinet to undertake, and, as a rule, it will not be undertaken if it can be avoided. Yet occasions may arise when it cannot be avoided without an inconvenience greater even than that of seeming to interfere in the internal affairs of a self-governing community.

We have an illustration of the point in the Canadian attempts to prohibit or restrict the immigration of British subjects of Asiatic origin. During the past few years some thousands of Indian traders and agriculturists have settled in British Columbia. The white inhabitants object to these intruders, and are determined that their number shall not be increased. Pressure has therefore been put upon the Ottawa Government to issue ordinances and

regulations which make it extremely difficult for Indians, even of good means and education, to settle in the Dominion. It has been pointed out that the orders of the Canadian Government press more hardly upon the Indian immigrants than upon the Japanese and Chinese; for owing to special treaties with Japan and China the natives of those countries cannot be excluded altogether, though they may be compelled to pay a heavy fine or poll-tax. But there are no treaties between Canada and British India, and thus British subjects can be treated (and it is alleged are treated) in a British state worse than foreigners. Not long since a public meeting was called by some prominent Indians resident in London to consider this subject; and Lord Roberts, naturally sympathetic with the thrifty and industrious Sikh cultivators and traders who form the bulk of the emigrants, was asked for his support. He wrote a letter to the chairman of the meeting in which he said: "I quite appreciate the hardships of British-Indian residents in Canada. The whole question is a very difficult one to advise upon, as it is not possible for the British Government to dictate to the Dominion

in such matters." That no doubt is the observation that would occur to most of us. It is not possible—for the British Government—to dictate to the Dominions.

But this bald statement does not quite dispose of the case. Those of us who have been on the Pacific Coast will understand and sympathise with the feelings of the white people of British Columbia. But if we have tried to understand Indian sentiment we may sympathise also with Asiatic subjects of the Kaisar-i-Hind who find themselves powerless under disabilities to which Japan will not submit. We may be able to disregard Indian discontent. But suppose that one of our self-governing states discriminated unfavourably against the citizens or even the products of another? In that event could the Home Government retain its neutrality, and fall back upon the dictum that we cannot dictate to the Dominions? We find ourselves here in contact with a very grave problem, a problem which our statesmanship has not touched and hardly even debated. I do not pretend to give the solution; I propound the question as one which may well occupy our attention. But I

suggest that it will be easier to reconcile the claims and aspirations of the different communities when they are discussed and considered in common and under the sense of a common responsibility. Perhaps when our colonists are helping to govern India they may be more tolerant of Indian settlers; they may even consider that the peopling of such vast tropical or sub-tropical solitudes as the Australian Northern Territory with Asiatics who have been born under British jurisdiction may be the safest method of preserving them from Asiatics of Mongolian race and foreign allegiance. Or if such a contingency should arise as that I have just supposed, and it becomes necessary to ask one community to curtail its freedom of action, it will be easier to obtain the sacrifice when the request is made with the united voice of all the other states in the interests of the whole family of nations.

As to foreign policy, it is obvious that the present situation is anomalous and might easily become dangerous. We can impose the perils and inconveniences of hostilities with a great Power upon any of our colonies without consulting its people, who might strongly dis-

approve of the policy which has led to the war. In 1902 we entered into an *entente* with Japan with the result, and I presume the object, of enabling that country to fight out her quarrel with Russia without interference, and so to become, as she is to-day, the dominant Power in the Western Pacific. There were good reasons for this Anglo-Japanese agreement, and in any case it would be foreign to my present purpose either to attack or defend it. But it is not to the interest of Australia that Japan should have a free hand in the Southern and Eastern seas, and I think it highly probable that the alliance would not have been concluded if Australian statesmen had been consulted, and if its significance and effect had been made clear to them. We are bound to recognise that in the future grave complications may arise between Japan and China and Australia. Can they be properly dealt with unless Australia has some share in the direction of foreign policy? And, on the other hand, can the united strength of the Empire be brought to the aid of Australia, unless the Empire as a whole has made itself responsible for Australian actions? I can imagine the

elector in New Brunswick, or Manitoba, or perhaps Middlesex, saying to his kinsman at the Antipodes: "We are not parties to your proceedings; we were not consulted about them; perhaps if we had been consulted we should have told you we did not like them at all. But it seems that whether we like them or not we have got to pay for them." The friction would be materially lessened if the Australian policy had already been sanctioned by a council or assembly in which the New Brunswicker, the Manitoban, and the Londoner were all represented.

The question, then, before the English-speaking peoples is to find some means of mitigating the evils and the perils to which I have hastily adverted. What can be done to modify the present system of loose and indefinite association? There are some people who will reply that nothing need be done. It is best to leave things to take their course. There is a considerable body of opinion both in the Dominions and at home which deprecates any attempt to bring about closer union. In Canada, in particular, there are many able men, of whom the respected late Premier, Sir Wilfrid

Laurier, is the most distinguished, who do not desire to deflect the trend of events. They are satisfied with an arrangement which allows the fullest development to colonial nationalism, and they would not object to carrying it even further. I suppose that in the minds of some of them there is the idea not so much of a World-Empire as of a World-Alliance. They seem to contemplate a league of separate and independent nations, each with its own government, its own foreign policy, its own fleets and armies and tariffs, united by no organic ties, but kept in amity by the bonds of sentiment, tradition, and race, bound together by no formal apparatus of government, but pledged to mutual armed support against aggression, and mutual efforts to maintain the peace of the world, visiting each other's homes, buying each other's goods, reading each other's books, studying in each other's schools and colleges.

It is an ennobling ideal, and one can recognise its attractiveness. But is it possible? Can widely scattered states and communities be kept together on such a basis? Are sentiment and interest a sufficient substitute for definite political organisation? Such leagues

have been compacted before and have seldom endured for long. Take the case of the ancient Greek republics. And here, perhaps, I may be allowed to remark that I hope the study of the British Empire will be pursued with frequent reference to the lessons of Greek and Roman history, the former as well as the latter. Sir Charles Lucas, in a fascinating address, has advised us to pay the closest attention to the records of imperial Rome. Certainly we cannot know too much about the Roman Empire. But is there not much also that we can learn from Greece? The Hellenic system of States was not an Empire, it had no vast area of subject territory, but it had certain analogies with our own. It was based upon democracy and sea-power, even as later Rome rested upon autocracy and military force; it was made up of self-governing communities, partly continental, partly insular, all joined by the sea, all dependent for existence on trade rather than conquest, all of common or kindred origin. And a most noticeable characteristic of those interesting and gifted people was their political instability, their incapacity to resist external pressure. Why did the republics fall

so easily, not merely before the might of Rome, but before a Macedonian prince at the head of an army of Thracian and Albanian tribesmen? It was not lack of size and numbers, for the Greek settlements, which extended from Cadiz to Anatolia, from the Caucasus to the Nile, spread over no small part of the then known world. It was not any want of fighting power, for the victors of Marathon and Salamis were soldiers and sailors of quite first-rate quality.

There were diverse causes for the decline of Hellas, including that "race-suicide" to which Aristotle ascribes the fall of Sparta. But one most efficient factor was the failure of the Greek republics to reconcile democracy with imperialism, state self-government with the larger unity of the race. They were linked by ties of race, religion, sentiment, literature, and sport, much more closely than the Britannic peoples. But those ties proved too weak to enable them to act together for any length of time. The πόλις, the self-governing city-state, could not subordinate its ambitions and aspirations to the common welfare. There was no real union; there was no common centre of political energy; and when attempts

were made at partial federation, as in the Ætolian and the Achæan leagues, it was too late to build up the units of local autonomy into a stable political synthesis. Would there not be a danger that the Britannic nations may meet with the same fate of dispersal, weakness, and even, I fear, mutual antagonism, if they trust to those bonds of sentiment, so precious, but so capricious and uncertain, which could not keep the Greek republics of the Mediterranean or the Italian republics of the Middle Ages from becoming the prey of more solidly framed opponents?

If we reject the alternative of allowing the *status quo* to continue until the centrifugal forces develop towards separation, we are left with the task of developing local nationalism under a common constitutional machinery for common political purposes. That as it seems to me is the problem of Empire. It is full of difficulties. Some of them lie on the surface. If imperial defence is to be provided out of imperial funds, there must be some common financial authority. Is that authority to have power to levy taxation not only in the United Kingdom but in the Dominions? Suppose it

does so, how can it enforce its mandate? Shall a common assembly make laws to bind the peoples of the self-governing states? Suppose that any state objects to this legislation? Is its Government to be compelled to carry such decrees into effect against its own will? And, if so, how is it to be compelled? Is a state to be at liberty to decide for itself whether it will obey the orders of a central executive or not? Or may any one member of the confederation be entitled to withdraw whenever it dissents from the conclusions of the rest?

I mention these points because it is as well to understand that the task which we are considering is not easy or simple. It is on the contrary very complex, and possibly the solution, if any can be found, may not be simple either. We may have to elaborate constitutional devices which shall conserve the spirit of democracy, and the essence of the representative principle (that great discovery which Britain has conferred upon the modern world), without insisting too rigidly upon representation based upon numbers. It is possible that consultation in deliberative assemblies, and the popular control of an executive, might

be secured by other means. I know that in public affairs we accept what has been called the infallibility of the odd man. But then I find that in other affairs, in business and in private life, the principle of the omnipotence of the majority and the impotence of the minority, is not so definitely observed. So perhaps the strictly arithmetical rule may not be the final method by which the popular will can be expressed. The point is of importance when we have to deal with a body corporate that includes one democratic community of forty-five millions and another of two hundred and forty thousand, not to mention some three hundred and fifty millions of subject peoples.

Let me now briefly mention some of the expedients which have been proposed for establishing closer union among the Empire States. There is first the old idea of parliamentary federation, that of rendering our central legislature really imperial. The proposal to give the Colonies representation in the House of Commons was occasionally brought forward in the eighteenth century and supported by Franklin, Pownall, and others.

Chatham drew up an elaborate scheme[1] of colonial representation in both Houses of Parliament. It was canvassed by William Penn, by Adam Smith, and by Burke and others. Burke dismissed it but only on geographical grounds. He thought that "Nature" forbade the representation of the colonies in Parliament owing to their remoteness. The author of the *Wealth of Nations* thought that the colonies should have their representatives in a British Parliament or "States-General of the British Empire," such representation being calculated on the basis of taxation; in which case he suggested that the British revenue, administrative and military, systems might be extended to all the American provinces. The difficulties, he admitted, were great; but none of them seemed to him insurmountable, not even that due to the remoteness of the colonies from the central seat of government. This objection at any rate applies no longer. Geography has been conquered; and Canada could send its members to Westminster

[1] It is among his Papers in the Record Office, and is summarised by Mr. A. L. Burt in his useful little volume on *Imperial Architects* (Oxford, 1913).

with less delay and expense than Scotland in the eighteenth century. The device of colonial representation has, in fact, been adopted by other Empires. In France the colonies elect their members to represent them in the Chamber of Deputies; in the United States Congress the oversea territories, the Philippines, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and Samoa, have their delegates in the House of Representatives who sit but do not vote.

In England the idea of colonial representation fell into abeyance during the earlier part of the nineteenth century. It was revived in 1884 when the Imperial Federation League was formed under the auspices of W. E. Forster, Sir John Colomb, Sir Frederick Young, and other active promoters of Empire unity, with Lord Rosebery as its chairman. The League was dissolved in 1893, after doing some useful work. We are sometimes told that its brief career only proved the futility of its aims. I do not think this justifiable criticism. Its scheme of imperial federation, never very definitely formulated, did not gain much support either at home or in the colonies. That was partly due to the fact that public opinion was

not ripe for it, since the question of imperial defence had hardly assumed a practical shape; partly because to the colonial mind imperial federation seemed to imply representation in a predominantly British Parliament, and consequently entanglement in the party politics of these islands. To that the colonists would not, and will not, consent. But it would be another matter if the Imperial Assembly were to take the form of a true Federal Congress, representing all the States, as distinct from the legislature of Britain as it would be from that of New Zealand.

In that form the idea of federation is still alive. Some of the arguments in its favour will be found stated with eloquence and impressiveness in the volume of addresses which Lord Milner has recently issued. The time may come when we shall see a sovereign Parliament of the British Federation, representing the entire self-governing Empire, and perhaps also the dependent Empire as well, deliberating and legislating on those matters which concern the whole. It will do this without in the least derogating from the sovereign powers, within their own sphere,

of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or of any other Parliament in the King's Dominions. We have so many examples of successful federation, both in the Empire and outside, that one may believe the difficulty in adapting it, even on this great scale, is not insurmountable: a system which in one or other of its forms has been found suitable for such diverse aggregations of peoples, kingdoms, and provinces, as the United States, the German Empire, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Confederation of Switzerland, may well prove elastic enough to apply to the conditions of the Britannic realm. Macaulay has made us all familiar with that hypothetical visitor from New Zealand who, in some remote century, is to sit upon a broken arch of London Bridge and trace the ruins of St. Paul's. To judge by what we are hearing about St. Paul's just now, one part of the prediction is extremely likely to be fulfilled. But the vision that presents itself to my mind is rather that of a New Zealand student of the University of London looking down from the gallery of the Federal Congress upon some great debate, in

which men born like himself under the Southern Cross, and men who first drew breath to the blasts of the northern winter, will join issue in the affairs of the Realm that is the common heritage of them all.

For federation, however, we must recognise that colonial opinion is not yet fully prepared, unless perhaps it is in New Zealand itself. At the last Imperial Conference a proposal was brought forward by Sir Joseph Ward, the New Zealand Premier, for the creation of an imperial House of Representatives, elected by all the self-governing States, to control defence, foreign policy, and other matters. The proposal, which was somewhat vaguely defined, was rejected by all the other delegations, as some tentative efforts in the same direction have always been, in whatever shape formulated, for the past quarter of a century. The colonial distrust of formal federation proposals is intelligible enough. They have seemed to run athwart that development of nationalism on which our colonists have been so strongly set. The shirt is nearer to the skin than the coat, and the colonists, absorbed in the supreme task of turning their scattered settlements into organised

nations, have feared to merge themselves into the older and greater community at home. They wish to remain Canadians, Australians, Afrikanders; and they are only now reaching the stage at which it seems they may be partners, rather than appendages of England.

They have been suspicious not only of Britain but of London, and they shrink with a certain misgiving from exposing their politicians to the influence of our party politics, our newspapers, our fashionable society, even the lavish hospitality with which it has become the custom to treat them when they come here on imperial business. To do business in the intervals of constant banqueting is trying even to our hardy kinsmen from beyond the seas; and I have heard it suggested that colonial representatives at an Imperial Conference in London should be sent over in pairs, one delegate to attend the meetings, and the other, a statesman of proved endurance, to go out to dinner.

In other ways the atmosphere of a great capital is felt to be unfavourable to the conduct of Federal affairs, so that some of the most successful modern federations have wisely placed their seat of government and legislation in a second-

ary town like Washington, Ottawa, or Canberra, rather than in the centres of commerce and population. I have even seen it brought forward as an argument against imperial federation, that the new Parliament of the Empire would necessarily meet at Westminster in proximity to the old Parliament of the kingdom, and would either overshadow that august assembly or be itself overshadowed.

But this difficulty at least is not insuperable. The Federal Congress might meet on that site, within a few yards of this chamber, which Lord Grey seeks to earmark for the palace of Empire in the future. But I think an even better locale might be chosen. I would leave the palace and precincts of Westminster, with all its traditions and memorials, its monuments of ancient architecture, and its painful examples of modern plastic art, to the venerable mother of Parliaments, without a rival near her historic throne. For the Federal Parliament I wish there could be allotted a Federal district, some small tract of English earth which should be carved out of the national jurisdiction and left under the direct control of the Imperial Government.

We might conceivably make a district of

Columbia of the Isle of Wight, where the Federal statesmen would be free from the distractions of the metropolis and refreshed by the Channel breezes. But I would suggest a more dignified and famous site for the Empire capital. It is a site within easy reach of London, yet well outside its embrace, a site hallowed by the memories of a thousand years and more, the chosen seat of the monarchy from Saxon times to our own, a site associated, scarcely less than Westminster itself, with the story of our constitution, and a site, too, adorned by stately and venerable buildings. It is, of course, to Windsor that I refer. What more fitting than that Windsor, with its adjacent towns, and parks, and fields, and the palace of the Empire King, should be placed under the wardenship of the Empire Kingdoms: and that there another palace should be built for the Pan-Britannic Council, from whose windows the members could look up to King Arthur's Mound with its coronal of battlemented towers, and down towards the meadow of Runnimede and the island of Magna Charta?

But Federalism is for the future—a future which will be realised, but not yet, not till the

populations of the daughter states approach somewhat more closely to our own. When Canada has thirty millions of people I think many of her objections to organic union may disappear. In the interim we shall probably pass through that stage of voluntary confederation which in the United States and Germany preceded complete federalism. It is conceivable that an elastic constitution may be drafted to meet the views of those states that wish to join in a common representative council, leaving others to come in when they please, and on terms to be settled by negotiation in each case. Under such an arrangement any state would be entitled, but not compelled, to join the confederacy; and the Imperial Assembly would draw up and pass bills which, however, would not have the force of law in any state until adopted and ratified by its own legislature.

In all this region of imperial legislation we are of course in the preliminary stage, the stage of aspiration and examination. But in the machinery for consultation and common action substantial progress has been made. We have acquired during the past few years two real organs of imperial activity and advice. One

of these is the Committee of Imperial Defence, the other is the Imperial Conference.

How important the Defence Committee has become I do not think the public at large understands. It has grown, as institutions do in Britain, out of the passing needs of the moment. Its development and organisation are due in almost equal measures to two great living leaders of our two great parties, Mr. Asquith and Mr. Balfour; but it originated with the late Lord Salisbury, when he brought together a small committee of experts at the Foreign Office to study strategical questions, particularly in their bearing on foreign policy. His successor bestowed upon the Committee its present name, and provided it with a permanent secretariat, and a definite form. It was at first simply an advisory council which the Prime Minister could consult when he thought proper. He alone appointed the members, and he summoned to its deliberations anybody he pleased.

But it was soon seen that some regular or ex-officio members were necessary. Mr. Balfour appointed two permanent councillors who attended all meetings. Mr. Asquith instituted a

standing sub-committee which includes the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary for War, and the heads of their departments, together with representatives of the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, and the Army Council. This sub-committee is engaged in the constant study of strategic and technical questions, on which it accumulates a large amount of confidential material, and prepares reports and recommendations for the full committee.

The parent committee is still constitutionally only the Prime Minister's advisory council on defence. It is consultative, not executive. But it is now recognised that the Foreign Secretary, the Colonial Secretary, the Secretary for India, and the ministers for the two warlike departments, together with the head of the Army Council and the Board of the Admiralty, are permanent members, and that high strategic authorities, like Lord Kitchener, whether in office or not, will be summoned from time to time.

This is not all. The organisation goes outside the party system and beyond the United Kingdom. Mr. Asquith has taken the excellent step of inviting Mr. Balfour to serve on one of

the sub-committees: I believe that before long the leader of the Opposition will be regularly summoned to the committee's meetings as an ex-officio member; and I imagine this would be in accordance with the views of many Englishmen, who do not see why political business should always be conducted like a cricket match with nearly half the performers lounging in the pavilion half the time.

It also meets the views of some colonial statesmen. Three years ago, Mr. Borden suggested that an Imperial Defence Committee should be composed of men belonging to both parties in Great Britain, as well as in the Dominions. During the visit of the Colonial Ministers for the 1911 Conference they were invited to attend a meeting of the Committee. No doubt the Dominion Premiers and Ministers of Defence will always be summoned when in England. In their absence there should be, and probably will be, permanent colonial representatives. There is some difficulty in arranging this in practice, because if the representative is not a Cabinet Minister he might not carry sufficient weight, and if he is a Cabinet Minister, his constituents might object to pay him a large

salary to live in London and fill up the time between the meetings of the Committee by going out to dinners and making agreeable speeches on things in general, a function already effectively discharged, at no cost to the British Empire, by the American Ambassador. But, in some form or other, we shall see the Dominions taking part regularly, through authoritative delegates, in the Committee's deliberations. Meanwhile, local branches of the Imperial Defence Committee are to be established in each Dominion, which will work in close touch with the central body in London, receive its reports and confidential communications, and occasionally exchange members with it.

Here, then, is an instrument for imperial co-operation which is already in good working order. Nominally, it deals only with questions of defence. But defence covers much besides military and naval armaments. It is closely interwoven with foreign policy, and it touches also on cable communications, commerce protection, maritime trade routes, food supply, and financial administration, and the problems connected with the maintenance of national

efficiency. On these matters the governments of the Empire are now engaged in regular consultation, through the Defence Committee, and are in a position to recommend similar or complementary measures to their Legislatures. The Committee is a very valuable creation, and its evolution is highly creditable to the statesmen—the statesmen of both parties —who have assisted its growth.

One may, however, doubt whether it can continue to remain, as it is technically a mere advisory board to the British Cabinet. In this aspect it reproduces some of the features of the eighteenth century Board of Trade and Plantations, which was instituted in order to give ministers advice and information on colonial matters. The operations of that body were not wholly fortunate, though extremely well meant. As Mr. H. W. Temperley has pointed out, in an interesting paper read at the late Congress of Historical Studies, the Board was always trying to impose upon the colonies, through the Cabinet and the Colonial Governors, its own ideas of progress and improvement. The American Colonies were not lost because English statesmen forgot them, but because

they remembered them rather too well, and constantly interfered in deference to a policy worked out in the antechambers of the English Cabinet. This particular danger is not likely to recur in precisely the same shape. But the Imperial Defence Committee ought to be guarded from too close a connection with the group of public servants who are, in colonial eyes, the leaders of the political party dominant for the time being in one only of the self-governing states of the Empire. Sir Frederick Pollock has proposed that an Imperial Committee of the Privy Council should be instituted to advise the Crown, that is in practice the advisers of the Crown, on the common affairs of the Empire. This would be the strict and proper constitutional line of development, and perhaps the Defence Committee may ultimately assume that shape.

The second of the new organs is the Imperial Conference. Its evolution can be traced in the exhaustive reports of the five sessions held between 1887 and 1911. In the earlier Conferences the initiative in making proposals for closer union was taken rather by the statesmen of the mother country than by those of the

Dominions, still somewhat apprehensive of encroachments upon their autonomous nationalism. In 1887 the whole question was waved aside. In 1897 a majority of the delegates resolved that "the present political relations between the United Kingdom and the self-governing Colonies are generally satisfactory under the existing conditions of things." In 1902 Mr. Chamberlain's suggestion for a council of the Empire met with no response. The Conference of 1907 was preceded by a circular dispatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Alfred Lyttelton, in which it was proposed that the adjective "imperial" should be substituted for "colonial" in the title of the Conference, that India should be represented, and that the Conference should be provided with a permanent staff or commission to collect information and maintain its continuity between the meetings. The proposal was received favourably by Australia, New Zealand, and the Cape, but was looked upon coldly by Canada. At the Conference itself the Commonwealth brought forward a resolution for the establishment of an imperial council, formed from the ministries of Great

Britain and the other states, which should remain in existence between the sessions of the Conference and should have its permanent secretariat. The motion was opposed by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and rejected; and the late Sir John Colomb, the most energetic advocate of Imperial Federation in England, wrote disconsolately of "voices that call for real British Union" being "drowned by the shoutings for constitutional rights reverberating throughout the Empire from one self-governing state to another."[1]

But a good deal was done by this Conference of 1907. It resolved that, in future, the Imperial Conference should assemble regularly every four years; that the British Prime Minister, not the Colonial Secretary, should be the ex-officio president, and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions ex-officio members; that subsidiary conferences on questions concerning two or more states should be held between representatives of their governments, when required; and that a permanent secretarial staff should be established

[1] See H. d'Egville, *Imperial Defence and Closer Union*, pp. 161, 164.

under the direction of the Secretary for the Colonies. In 1911 the assembly met for the first time as the "Imperial" Conference, and for the first time the British Prime Minister was its president. All the premiers of the self-governing states were present, accompanied by other members of their cabinets; and important resolutions were passed on defence, shipping, the coastal trade, naturalisation, postal and telegraphic communications, the imperial appeal court, uniformity of laws, and various other topics of general interest. The New Zealand plan for an imperial house of representatives, as already stated, received no support from the other Dominions; and the proposal of the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Harcourt, for an imperial consultative council at the Colonial Office was also rejected. The question of fiscal union was not discussed, except in general terms, as it was held that no practical result could be attained under existing conditions.

The Imperial Conference is rightly described by its title. It is a body of ministers who meet to confer. It is still a purely advisory body; its resolutions have no binding force.

But they are passed by the men who speak with the authority of the various governments and parliamentary majorities behind them, and it may be assumed that what they resolve, especially when the resolution is unanimous, will eventually take shape in executive or legislative action. If, for instance, it should be decided by the Conference that the coinage, the naturalisation system, or the marriage laws should be identical throughout the Empire, we might expect that measures to that effect would in due course be laid before each of the legislatures. Again, the common policy of defence can be determined not only by resolution of the Conference but by negotiations between the Home Government and the Colonial Cabinets while the Conference is in session, and by such statements on foreign affairs as that of Sir Edward Grey which produced so deep an impression on the delegates of 1907.

It is to the Imperial Conference that some advocates of organic union look for the realisation of their ideal. They expect that it will meet at more frequent intervals; and that its secretariat, instead of being as at present a

mere department of the Colonial Office, will become an authoritative board responsible to the Conference itself. It is suggested that each government might have, in the officers of this board, a kind of permanent commission or delegacy working in London under the supervision of a member of the local cabinet, who would pay frequent visits to this country. Mr. Amery[1] has proposed that the ministers should be accompanied by a deputation of members of their respective Parliaments. These parliamentary delegates would not take part in the debates on the Conference, but they could discuss the resolutions submitted with one another and with a delegation from the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Mr. d'Egville, who has been active in the movement for Imperial Union, and has written a book to record the life-work of Sir John Colomb,[2] carries the idea further. He proposes that the leader of the Opposition should be an ex-officio member of each parliamentary deputation; and that a system should be established whereby the questions to be submitted at a

[1] L. S. Amery, *Union and Strength*, p. 43.
[2] *Imperial Defence and Closer Union* (1913).

session of the Imperial Conference should be considered beforehand by special committees appointed for that purpose in the various parliaments. The reports of these committees would indicate what the trend of parliamentary, and presumably popular, feeling was in relation to them. Another proposal is that of Sir John Quick, one of the founders of Australian Federation, who contemplates a deputation from each of the Dominion parliaments assembling every five years to discuss questions that would require uniform legislation. All these schemes aim at bringing not merely the governments, but the parliaments and the peoples of the Empire, into relations; and the idea is sound, for the self-governing states are a collection of democracies, and if they are to work together it will be on democratic lines.

Thus in many ways we are moving towards imperial co-operation, imperial consultation, perhaps in time to imperial constitutional union. But while these tendencies are slowly maturing, the necessity of an imperial executive has to be met. We are feeling the need of some body or group of officials to manage those common affairs, on which we require not merely de-

liberation, or even legislation, but action. The Crown is the one common imperial authority; and the Crown in its imperial capacity, in its position as mediator or arbiter among the states, and guardian of their interests against the external world, needs responsible advisers. We have reached the point at which we seem to want certain ministers to transact the joint affairs of the realm. In the first place, there must be a chief, the functionary who might be called the imperial Chancellor, though I think it would be more in consonance with English usage and tradition to style him the imperial Secretary of State. We want this Premier, or Chancellor, or State Secretary for the Empire, to advise the Crown on those subjects which are beyond the competence of any one of its national Prime Ministers. Secondly, we must of course have a Foreign Secretary, to conduct the diplomacy which must be regarded in the future as the business of the Empire rather than the nation. In the third place, imperial defence should be under the responsibility of an imperial minister; and the contributions of the various states for this and other joint purposes will involve an imperial Budget with its own

Treasurer. Then, again, there must be before long a Department of Imperial Communications to superintend and co-ordinate the posts, telegraphs, ocean cables, and steamship routes of the Empire, and to control and direct emigration. And then I suppose there will have to be eventually some such officer as an Imperial Attorney-General or Minister of Justice, to deal with the legal and constitutional questions that affect the entire realm, the conflict of laws, the Imperial Appeal Court, and so forth. There may be other ministers, perhaps an Imperial Minister of Education and an Imperial Minister of Labour; and when the self-governing States are given their share in the control of the Dependencies then the Secretary for India and the Secretary for the Colonies will be out of their places in a Ministry selected only by the constituencies of the United Kingdom. Here, then, we have the Empire Cabinet, the advisers of the Crown on extra-national or supra-national affairs, and the responsible executive in those matters which overlap the powers of the several governments or lie outside them.

I have said that the need of this imperial

executive will be felt. But, in fact, it *is* felt, and to some extent is being supplied. The Crown does already need responsible advice on imperial affairs; and it gets it from certain members of its Cabinet for the United Kingdom. As a fact, during the past few years, the Prime Minister has had to take upon himself many of the functions of an Imperial Chancellor. The transfer to him from the Colonial Secretary of the presidency of the Imperial Conference is one indication of this tendency; his position in relation to the Defence Committee is another. No Prime Minister has ever had so much imperial business to discharge as Mr. Asquith, or has been in such close communication with the other Governments of the Empire. The Foreign Secretary is so far recognised as an imperial officer that he is allowed to communicate confidential information to the state governments which he has not given to his own Parliament. The First Lord of the Admiralty seems to be drifting towards the status of Imperial Minister of Defence, when we find him directing a navy to which Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Malaya are, or may be, contributories as well as the United Kingdom.

I presume that in these matters we shall follow our rather sensible British custom of first doing a thing and then discovering that we have done it. Before long we may call the head of our insular executive Prime Minister and Imperial Secretary; we may regularise the position of his colleague at Downing Street by styling him Imperial Secretary for Foreign Affairs; we may have an imperial rather than a royal navy; we shall submit to seeing certain ministers more and more absorbed in their imperial duties and less able to give time and attention to their tasks as parliamentary leaders. And then, after a time, we shall recognise that the two functions cannot conveniently be exercised by the same persons, and we shall proceed to separate them. The Imperial Secretary of State, the Foreign Secretary, the Imperial Ministers of Justice and Communications, and others, will be withdrawn from the British cabinet; we shall find that the growing importance of inter-State finance will demand the creation of an Imperial Chancellor of the Exchequer, to hold and account for the sums contributed from the state treasuries for defence and other purposes. Naval administra-

tion will hardly be removed from the direct control of the British House of Commons so long as the United Kingdom defrays the greater part of its cost, and the military establishments will long remain purely national. But perhaps the secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee, or the head of the Imperial General Staff, may join the new Ministry. We shall leave the British cabinet to deal with British affairs as the Australian and Canadian cabinets deal with those of the Commonwealth and the Dominion; and we shall then have an Empire executive, and an imperial committee of privy councillors, competent to advise the Crown on imperial business.

But to whom is this executive to be responsible? To whom shall it render an account of its stewardship? What body will vote the Imperial Budget and be able to grant or withhold supplies? In the end one may imagine that this body will be the Pan-Britannic Parliament, the Federal Congress representing all the peoples of the constituent States. But that, as we admit, is a vision of the future, a future which is at any rate remote. Our executive cannot wait till complete federalism is

achieved. There are some who think that the answer to the question just put will be found in the development of the Imperial Conference. It would be difficult to set bounds to the growth of the Conference, and it may be so widened as to serve the required purpose. But a council of governments does not seem suited to check and control another government. We can have no constitutional executive that does not in the last resort rest on a democratic, or at least a parliamentary, basis. It is by the expedient of parliamentary delegations that the solution of the problem may possibly be found. Perhaps the way to it will be paved by that association of parliamentary deputations with the work of the Imperial Conference which has already been proposed by Mr. Amery and others. Some such device has already been adopted in Austria-Hungary, where the common ministers discuss the common affairs of the Monarchy, and arrange the common Budget, with delegations elected by the legislative chambers of the two states. You may say that the example is not altogether happy. The parliamentary system does not work with complete smoothness in Hungary, a country

where it seems to be necessary at intervals to have the entire Opposition removed by the police. But the delegations have at least rendered joint executive action possible in a union of two autonomous, and indeed independent, nations.

Our Britannic delegations would take the form of representative bodies from each of the parliaments of the Empire, which would meet in session at the Empire capital in order to discuss and pass the votes for the salaries of the imperial ministers and the sums required for the service of their departments. They should be chosen under some method which would ensure that the minority groups in each legislature, as well as the majority, had a voice in the selection. Their numbers would, I suppose, be proportionate to the population of their states. There might, for example, be two delegates for every million white inhabitants, with the proviso that no state should have less than four delegates. I leave out of consideration the case of the Dependencies, because if our gigantic coloured populations are represented at all it must obviously be on some other basis than that of numbers. The arrangement suggested would give us, for the

self-governing communities, a House of between one hundred and twenty and one hundred and thirty members, of which the United Kingdom would have ninety.

Two objections will naturally occur. It may be said that the Colonies would refuse to take part in a representative assembly of a hundred or more in which New Zealand and Newfoundland would have only four votes each, and in which all the Dominions would be overborne by the weight of the United Kingdom. But it must be remembered, in the first place, that in strictly imperial affairs those smaller states are overborne already. What power has Newfoundland to control foreign policy? The delegation method would at least give it an opportunity for discussing that policy and expressing its opinions in an authoritative fashion. The small nations would have some voice where they now have none; they might persuade if they could not command. In the second place, it would be provided that the delegates are to represent not the dominant parties but the parliaments as a whole, not the governments but the peoples. In these circumstances we need not suppose that each

delegation would act as a single unit. There would be divisions and cross-divisions, which would not always run on national lines; and if Colonial opinion happened on any occasion to be opposed to that of the British majority, it might find support in the British minority.

Further, it must be remembered that this disparity of numbers tends to be altered every year against the mother country and in favour of the Dominions, and may disappear altogether when an imperial executive has devised a really effectual system of human interchange between the crowded countries, where men are too thick on the ground, and the new lands, where they are all too few to till the soil. This would be one of the beneficial preoccupations of the Empire Cabinet. We speak sometimes as if imperial defence were the only reason for closer union. Defence is a matter of prime and urgent necessity, and we cannot be deaf to its calls in a world clad in iron and bending under the weight of its armour. But it is not the sole cause for the Britannic nations to draw together and work together. We should need organic union even if there were no menace of foreign battleships. We need it for the

work of peace as well as that of war, for the solution of those economic, social, psychological, and physical problems which press upon all civilised societies with the increasing complexity of life under industrial conditions.[1] The reformers of the nineteenth century hoped to ease the stress by breaking down the barriers of nations and making effort and intercourse cosmopolitan. We approach nearer that shadowy goal when we can pool, so to speak, the knowledge, the energies, the natural resources, and the natural deficiencies of so large a part of the habitable globe that it may be called almost a world in itself. That is why I should look for an imperial executive even if the compulsion of external pressure were not driving us to it. And for that reason I shall hope not only for an Imperial Minister of Defence and an Imperial Foreign Secretary, but also for an Imperial Minister of Transport, an Imperial Minister of Labour, an Imperial Minister of Education, and (why not?) even an Imperial Minister of Health and Sanitary Research.

No man ought to speak upon these subjects in any spirit of dogmatism. I have been

putting forward some merely tentative proposals, a few hints drawn from what seems to me to be the tendency of events. I am far indeed from urging that our statesmen should be in haste to set up a machine-made constitution, still less that they should press it upon the colonies before colonial sentiment is ripe to receive it. But, taking a broad view, I believe there is some justification for that sketch of the coming structure which I have ventured in the barest outline to lay before you. To recapitulate them, I think we may look for a further development of the Imperial Conference and its Imperial Secretariat; for an extension both of the powers and the representative character of the Committee of Imperial Defence; for a recognition of the imperial functions of certain members of the British Cabinet; then for a separation of those functions from their duties as British ministers, and so to the creation of a distinct Empire Cabinet, under an Imperial Chancellor or Secretary of State; for the formation of a representative body, formed of delegations from the various Parliaments, to examine the common Budget and control the administration

of the funds allocated by the states for joint purposes. And perhaps this machinery, based at once upon the constitutional prerogative of the Crown, and upon the ultimate rule of the democracies, may suffice till the world-realm is at length ready to knit itself together into a fully organised federal union. How that ultimate goal will be gained, and what causes will arise to expedite or delay the process, who can be bold enough to predict? The finger-post that points us towards our destination does not tell us how broken and rugged is the road we must traverse before the journey's end is reached.

The path lies before us, and winds up among the mists and mountain tops of the future. Perhaps one can do little beyond casting a few glimmering rays upon it. But the fuller light can come only from close observation of present conditions, and careful study of the past. It may be that in King's College and the University of London generally there will arise historians and scholars to learn and to teach the principles of Empire, to penetrate through its outer husk to the spirit that informs it. I hope they will not exaggerate

the importance of political or constitutional machinery, important as that is; and I hope they will not lay excessive stress on mere size and numbers. Our Empire is indeed great in the material sense; but I would almost sooner forget than remember that we count four hundred millions of human beings and own eleven million square miles of territory.

There have been great Empires before, almost as great as our own; in population China may be our equal, and it long surpassed us; in extent of territory we do not so much exceed the present Empire of Russia, or the former Monarchy of Spain and the Indies, when it could claim all South America, as well as Portugal, and the dominions of the House of Austria. History is full of the rise and fall of great Empires, it reverberates to what De Quincey calls "the drums and tramplings of a thousand conquests"; its sands are white with the wrecks of imperial structures scarcely less imposing than our own. If we seek to consolidate and strengthen the realm of Britain, it is not mainly because of its size, it is because we believe it to be not only a great Empire but a good Empire,

because on the whole we think it may become the most potent instrument ever forged by human hands to promote the order, the progress, the freedom, and the peace of the world.

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